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Iqbal and Twombly introduced a new standard for pleading federal
claims by overruling five-decades old language from Conley v. Gibson.
Instead of plaintiffs being entitled to discovery unless the complaint af-
firmatively forecloses the possibility of recovery, Iqbal and Twombly re-
quire a more searching evaluation of the complaint under an ambiguous
“plausibility” standard.  The policy behind this increased burden on
plaintiffs is to prevent the false positive error that burdensome discovery
creates.
How the plausibility standard from Iqbal and Twombly should op-
erate in the real world is poorly understood.  There is general acknowl-
edgement that no clear guidance exists about how to ensure only
plausible inferences are indulged.  Professor Josh Davis recently
summed up the sentiments: “Twombly is a very confusing decision.  I
really do think . . . it’s going to be a while before we get a rule that
produces predictable results.”  Professor Adam Steinman is more hyper-
bolic: “thanks to” Twombly and Iqbal, “federal pleading standards are
in a crisis.”
This Article fills the void in scholarly and judicial thought by pro-
viding an understanding of the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard that is
both theoretically sound and pragmatic.  Our approach turns on the pol-
icy underlying Iqbal and Twombly—a concern that permitting the case
to proceed past the motion to dismiss creates a high-expected cost of
false positive error through non-merit-based settlements.  The expected
cost of false positive error is a function of two variables: the cost to
society if the error occurs and the likelihood that the error will occur.
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The cost to society if false positive error occurs varies among different
areas of substantive law.  The likelihood that false positive error will
occur varies by the type of facts in controversy.  We use antitrust law as
an example of the effects of those two variables.  Because false positive
error in antitrust is costly to society, the analysis focuses on the likeli-
hood of false positive error.
The likelihood of false positive error depends on the nature of the
facts in controversy and the manner in which proof of those facts will be
made.  If evidence of contested facts is uniquely in the defendant’s hands,
it can be retrieved (or its absence shown) only through burdensome and
asymmetrical discovery by the defendant.  If evidence of contested facts
is public or quasi-public in nature, it can be gathered without dispropor-
tionate burden being placed on the defendant.  Whether discovery will be
disproportionately burdensome on the defendant will affect the defen-
dant’s incentive to settle.  Settlements to avoid burdensome discovery re-
sult in false positives.  Using antitrust law as an example, we
demonstrate that different elements of different substantive claims give
rise to different likelihoods of false positives.  This approach is trans-
substantive, and the same inquiry we conduct should be conducted for
any claim brought in federal litigation.  This analysis resolves the uncer-
tainty left in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal.
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INTRODUCTION
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,1 the plaintiff alleged that then-Attorney Gen-
eral John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller violated his civil
rights by incarcerating him under harsh conditions in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on account of his race, religion, or
national origin.  The plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim under
Rule 8 and, the Supreme Court held, was subject to dismissal.2  In Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,3 the plaintiffs alleged that defendant local
telephone carriers had failed to enter into competition with one another
in their respective monopoly service markets, despite the plaintiffs’ ex-
pectation that competition would occur after local telephone service was
deregulated in 1996.  On information and belief, the defendants had con-
1 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
2 Id. at 1954.
3 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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spired, but again, the Supreme Court approved the district court’s dis-
missing the complaint because it failed to state a claim.4
Iqbal made clear for the first time that Twombly’s controversial
pleading standard applied to all civil actions under the Federal Rules, and
not only to the antitrust conspiracies directly at issue in Twombly.  The
pleading standard set forth in Rule 8, and enforced by dismissals under
Rule 12(b)(6), controls when a plaintiff will have access to discovery—
and potentially trial—in federal court in all civil claims. Twombly and
Iqbal set forth a murky standard phrased in terms of the “plausibility” of
the inferences to be drawn from the factual allegations in the complaint.
Because the plausibility standard controls access to litigation in every
civil action in federal court, piercing the murk of the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard is crucial.  This Article analyzes the underlying ra-
tionale for the Twombly/Iqbal standard and argues that the trans-substan-
tive rule applies differently to various types of factual allegations.  The
height of the plausibility standard thus varies depending on the nature of
the facts relevant to the substantive element pled.
The Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard is rooted in a concern that
allowing a plaintiff to proceed to discovery creates a possibility that a
defendant facing a nonmeritorious claim will settle rather than endure the
burdens of discovery.  Such settlements create so-called “false posi-
tives,” because a plaintiff recovers a remedy to which she is not entitled.
False positives reflect a wealth transfer from an innocent defendant to an
undeserving plaintiff.  They also induce parties to order their affairs to
avoid innocent behavior that might give rise to false positives in the fu-
ture.  This over-deterrent effect results in harm to parties who never end
up in court, and imposes an external social cost where the over-deterred
party’s conduct is beneficial.  The relevant question is not absolute cost,
but the expected cost of false positive error.
The expected cost of false positives also depends on the likelihood
of false positives.  The likelihood of false positives turns on the burden
created by discovery in a particular context.  Nonburdensome discovery
does not produce a great incentive to settle.5  Burdensomeness depends
on the nature of the contested facts.  Facts that are uniquely in the hands
of the defendants threaten to create a substantial burden.  Contested facts
available both to the plaintiff and the defendant threaten a much lesser
burden.  Whether facts are uniquely in the hands of the defendant varies
4 Id. at 548.
5 Of course, a defendant concerned about the result in litigation is incentivized to settle
no matter how light the discovery burden, but such a settlement does not reflect a false positive
connected to an unduly permissive pleading standard. But see Daniel Crane, Technocracy and
Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1185 (2008) (explaining Twombly by reference to fears of
jury incompetence).
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depending on the particular element of a substantive claim in
controversy.
Part I analyzes the change in the pleading standard that occurred in
Twombly and Iqbal.  Part II examines the rationale for the Twombly/Iqbal
plausibility standard and its relationship to the various types of facts that
can be put in controversy by different types of elements of substantive
claims.  This examination produces the conclusion that applying the
Twombly/Iqbal standard requires separately analyzing the likelihood of
false positives raised by each element of a substantive claim.  Part III
undertakes this analysis in the context of antitrust claims under Sections
One and Two of the Sherman Act.  The sub-parts of Part III identify an
element of a Sherman Act claim, analyze the nature of facts necessary to
prove the element, and explain how the plausibility standard should ap-
ply to facts of that nature.  In Part IV, we test decided cases for their
adherence to the expected cost of false positive error framework.  We
conclude in the final Part by suggesting that a similar element-by-ele-
ment analysis is necessary for each substantive field of federal civil
litigation.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD
Prior to 2007, with Conley v. Gibson6 as the leading authority on
federal pleading standards, most believed plaintiffs were entitled to liti-
gate beyond the complaint so long as the complaint itself did not affirma-
tively foreclose the plaintiff’s right to relief.7  That doctrine is no longer
valid.8
Twombly involved a cartel-conduct claim.  Allegations of conduct
culminating in an allegation that “on information and belief, the defend-
ants conspired” did not sufficiently make out a conspiracy claim capable
of surviving the defendant’s motion to dismiss.9 The Twombly Court “re-
6 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
7 One of us has argued that this understanding of Conley is shortsighted and was never
followed by courts. See Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Anti-
trust Conspiracy Claims, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 627, 636 (2008) [hereinafter Huffman,
The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy Claims].  Statistical data
offers grounds to question how meaningful Twombly has actually been on the dismissal rates
in federal litigation.  A snapshot of that data suggests dismissal rates have decreased. Com-
pare U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken, U.S.
COURTS (June 30, 2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicial
CaseloadStatistics.aspx (reporting that in the twelve months prior to June 30, 2008, 151,841 of
177,926 cases (85%) with court action were resolved “before pretrial”), with U.S. District
Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken, U.S. COURTS (June 30,
2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics.aspx
(reporting  that in the 12 months prior to June 30, 2005, 192,252 of 217,171 cases (88%) with
court action were resolved “before pretrial”).
8 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63.
9 See id. at 548–49.
\\server05\productn\C\CJP\20-1\CJP101.txt unknown Seq: 6  9-NOV-10 11:45
6 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:1
tire[d]” the “any state of facts” standard from Conley v. Gibson10 for
evaluating complaints.11
Iqbal arose two years later in the entirely different context of a Biv-
ens12 action against the nation’s top law enforcement officials, then-At-
torney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller.  The
plaintiff, a Pakistani Muslim man, alleged that the defendants had dis-
criminated against him, in violation of his rights under the U.S. Constitu-
tion.13  The complaint alleged that the defendants had “adopted an
unconstitutional policy that subjected [the plaintiff] to harsh conditions
of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national origin.”14
Iqbal is a more dramatic departure from the previously–settled under-
standing of the law governing pleading in federal court cases.  At a mini-
mum, Iqbal demonstrates that courts holding Twombly applicable outside
its narrow context have been correct.15 Iqbal also informs the applica-
tion of the Rule 8 standard in antitrust cases.  The remainder of this Part
details the development of the Rule 8 pleading standard over the past two
decades in the Supreme Court.
A. Leatherman and Dura Pharmaceuticals
Pleading authorities growing out of Conley v. Gibson—primarily
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit16 and Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo17—detail courts’ re-
views of allegations by private plaintiffs in various circumstances.
Leatherman teaches that heightened pleading under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) is not available for claims—in that case, federal civil
10 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
11 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63. Twombly set off shock waves jarring antitrust and civil
procedure scholars alike. See Kevin Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 N.D. L. REV.
1919, 1934 n.74 (2009) (citing multiple articles).  The reaction to Twombly in the courts is
more difficult to gauge. Twombly has been widely cited and discussed. See id. at n.73.  Al-
though thousands of courts have cited and discussed Twombly, relatively few have spilled
much ink on careful analyses of the purported new pleading standard and its impact on their
decisions on motions to dismiss. Twombly’s enormous citation counts are misleading.  Plead-
ing cases, not surprisingly, attract substantial citations for their legal propositions without at-
tracting discussion or analysis. But see Adam Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1293, 1295 n.9 (2010)  (drawing conclusions regarding Twombly’s influence from the
number of citations the case has received).
12 Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (establishing a
private right of action for violation of constitutional rights by federal government officials).
13 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (2009).
14 Id. at 1942.
15 See, e.g., In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1214,
1216 (D. Kan. 2008) (applying Twombly in a case claiming consumer fraud).
16 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
17 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
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rights claims—not specifically listed in Rule 9.18 Dura Pharmaceuticals
held that the plaintiff must plead all elements of private damages claims
under the securities laws.19  Specifically, under the facts of Dura
Pharmaceuticals, a plaintiff must plead that the alleged securities fraud
caused the loss that the plaintiff allegedly incurred.20  Both of those re-
cent pleading authorities are important for properly understanding Iqbal
and Twombly.
1. Plain-Language Interpretation of the Federal Rules
Leatherman arose in the context of civil rights claims against local
law enforcement officers.  Many courts and commentators at the time—
including the two lower courts in Leatherman21—believed that the chil-
ling effect on the work of law enforcement officers and municipal de-
fendants, created by the expense and inconvenience of defending against
private litigation, necessitated holding those claims to a “heightened”
pleading standard.22  A circuit split had developed over the question of
heightened pleading in civil rights claims against municipalities and local
officials entitled to qualified immunity.23  The Supreme Court reversed
the Fifth Circuit in Leatherman.24 It unanimously accepted a plain lan-
guage interpretation of Rule 9(b) and held that because civil rights claims
were not in the enumerated list of claims subject to heightened pleading
by Rule 9, requiring pleading with particularity was error.25  That rule
would apply equally to antitrust claims, as in Twombly, and Bivens ac-
tions, as in Iqbal, neither of which is enumerated in Rule 9.26
Leatherman did, however, leave open a substantive route to treating
antitrust claims differently from other claims.  The defendants in that
case argued that “the degree of factual specificity required of a complaint
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure varies according to the complex-
18 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.  Rule 9(b) provides, in relevant part: “In alleging fraud
or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mis-
take.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
19 See Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 346.
20 Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 346–47.
21 See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics & Intelligence Unit, 954 F.2d 1054 (5th
Cir. 1992).
22 Id. at 1056–59 (explaining the reasons for a rule requiring the plaintiffs to plead their
claims with particularity, which echo the reasons underlying the Court’s conclusions in
Twombly and Iqbal).
23 See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165.
24 See id. at 168.
25 See id.
26 Leatherman, then, forecloses one procedural route to treating antitrust claims differ-
ently from other sorts of claims. Leatherman does not necessarily end the procedural analysis,
however.  One of us has argued for another procedural approach, based on plain-language
interpretations of Rules 8(a), 8(f), and 12(b)(6). See Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Ele-
ments in Private Antitrust Conspiracy Claims, supra note 7, at 635–45. R
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ity of the underlying substantive law.”27  That approach, which the Court
did not reject, seemingly allowed a complex claim requiring circumstan-
tial proof of conduct, or proof of the effects of conduct, to be held to an
ostensibly higher standard than a simple tort claim.28  But as we show
infra, it is not the complexity of the claim, but the burden of discovery,
that drives the closer scrutiny of allegations in a complaint.
When Leatherman was decided, it set a ceiling for the specificity of
allegations necessary to state claims for any but the causes of action ref-
erenced in Rule 9(b).  The Rule 8 pleading standard was held to be trans-
substantive and to apply to all other claims.29  While Twombly altered
courts’ and commentators’ understanding of the Rule 8 pleading stan-
dard, Leatherman’s  trans-substantivity endured, setting a floor for the
minimum specificity required of allegations. Leatherman seemingly
mandated that Twombly not be limited to antitrust claims.  Thus, when
Iqbal came up for decision, the application of the Twombly rule was
foreordained.
2. Pleading Elements
Dura Pharmaceuticals involved a claim of fraud in the purchase or
sale of securities under SEC Rule 10b-5.30  The claim required proof of
six elements, including “loss causation.”31  Loss causation is the exis-
tence of a proximate causal link between a material misrepresentation
and the plaintiff’s loss.  The Dura Pharmaceuticals Court held that the
failure to plead loss causation undermined the notice to the defendant
that Rule 8 and Conley required.32 Dura Pharmaceuticals holds simply
that the notice requirement of Conley demands that the plaintiff plead
facts creating an inference on each element of the plaintiff’s claim.
The Dura Pharmaceuticals decision descends from a long tradition
of judicial skepticism toward private business tort litigation.  That skepti-
cism started with securities law claims, notably Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores.33  In 1983, the skepticism was imported into anti-
27 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167.
28 See Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy
Claims, supra note 7, at 640–41 (contrasting the complexity of pleading a conspiracy claim R
with the simplicity of pleading a negligence claim in the case of an automobile accident).
29 See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
30 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2004) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
31 Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341–42.
32 Id. at 346.  Although securities fraud claims are in many contexts subject to a height-
ened pleading standard under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(b), the Dura Pharmaceuticals Court assumed “at least for argument’s sake, that
neither the Rules nor the securities statutes impose any special further requirement in respect
to the pleading of proximate causation or economic loss.”  544 U.S. at 346.
33 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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trust law via dictum from Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Supreme Court
in Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters.34  The overriding concern in those business tort cases is one
of “strike suits” brought by enterprising plaintiffs’ counsel resulting in
settlements unrelated to the merits of claims or—in the rare case that a
case makes it to trial—jury verdicts that drive companies into bankruptcy
imposed by juries with wealth-transfer impulses.35  Given the wariness
toward strike suits, the false positive rationale is deeply embedded in the
Court’s Rule 8 jurisprudence.
The primary teaching of Dura Pharmaceuticals relates to the pro-
cess of evaluating complaints for sufficiency. Dura Pharmaceuticals
makes clear that the sufficiency of a complaint is analyzed on an ele-
ment-by-element basis.
B. Twombly
Twombly involved claims by a purported class of plaintiffs made up
of all users of telephone and internet services in the United States from
the date of the deregulation of local telephone service in February
1996.36  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant-local telephone compa-
nies (1) had conspired not to compete with one another in their respective
monopoly service markets37 and (2) had conspired to prevent would-be
new entrants from gaining toe-holds in their respective markets.38  The
market allocation would be a hard core, per se violation of the Sherman
Act if properly pleaded and proved.39
The dispute centered on the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ allegations re-
garding the defendants’ agreement.  The plaintiffs alleged circumstantial
evidence of the agreement, as opposed to direct evidence that the defend-
34 Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
528 n.17 (1983).
35 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740–42.
36 The purported class was comprised of “subscribers of local telephone and/or high
speed internet services . . . from February 8, 1996 to present.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007).
37 See id. at 551 (“Second, the complaint charges agreements by the ILECs to refrain
from competing against one another.  Those are to be inferred from the ILECs’ common fail-
ure ‘meaningfully [to] pursu[e]’ ‘attractive business opportunit[ies]’ in contiguous markets
where they possessed ‘substantial competitive advantages,’ and from a statement of the chief
executive officer (CEO) of the ILEC Qwest, that competing in the territory of another ILEC
‘might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that doesn’t make it right.’”).
38 Id. at 550 (“Plaintiffs say, first, that the ILECs ‘engaged in parallel conduct’ in their
respective service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart CLECs.”).
39 See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (holding horizontal market divi-
sion illegal per se); see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.2 (2000), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
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ants or their representatives had met and formed an agreement.40  The
plaintiffs also alleged the following circumstantial facts supporting their
views that the observed conduct must have resulted from a conspiracy:
the defendants’ territorial markets appeared gerrymandered, the defend-
ants were members of trade organizations that gave them opportunities to
meet and to reach agreement,41 and the CEO of one defendant had said
publicly that entering into competition as a new entrant “might be a good
way to turn a quick dollar, but that doesn’t make it right.”42  The
Twombly plaintiffs alleged the ultimate legal fact: “upon information and
belief that Defendants have entered into a contract, combination or
conspiracy.”43
The Court held the complaint insufficient, reversing the court of
appeals and reinstating the district court’s dismissal.  By requiring that
the allegations create a “plausible inference” of an agreement among the
defendants, the Supreme Court applied to the complaint a procedural
standard that courts had, for decades, used in antitrust cases on motions
for judgment as a matter of law.44  The Court had never before adopted
that standard for the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
40 See Amended Complaint paras. 37–51, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 02 CIV.
10220), 2003 WL 25629874.
41 Trade association membership is a common allegation in concerted conduct antitrust
litigation. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (dental association
rule prohibiting dentists from submitting x-rays in connection with insurance forms alleged to
be illegal); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
(1985) (cooperative association sued for expelling plaintiff for violating bylaw preventing
members from participating as wholesalers and retailers).
42 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551 (noting allegations made in the complaint by “Richard
Notebaert, chief executive officer (CEO) of the ILEC Qwest, that competing in the territory of
another ILEC ‘might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but that doesn’t make it right”).
Plaintiffs inferred from the statement that not taking advantage of the available “quick dollar”
was best explained by the existence of a conspiracy.
43 The complaint couches its penultimate allegations this way:
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [ILECs] in one another’s
markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct that each engaged in to prevent
competition from CLECs within their respective local telephone and/or high speed
internet services markets and the other facts and market circumstances alleged
above, Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that [the ILECs] have entered
into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry in their re-
spective local telephone and/or high speed internet services markets and have agreed
not to compete with one another and otherwise allocated customers and markets to
one another.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting the complaint).  That allegation, if it were to have been treated
as sufficient, would by itself have fulfilled the plaintiffs’ pleading burden because of the ir-
rebuttable presumption of market effects in a claim of per se illegal market allocation under
§ 1. See Palmer, 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990).
44 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (plausibility standard); see Edward Brunet, Antitrust Sum-
mary Judgment and the Quick Look Approach, 62 SMU L. REV. 493, 511 (2009).
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).45  The “mere possibility” stan-
dard from the Second Circuit was “short of the line.”46
An inference of conspiracy from the plaintiffs’ factual allegations
was insufficiently plausible to permit discovery in Twombly.  The Court
addressed the allegations singly.47  Allegations of parallel inhospitality to
entry and parallel failure to enter spoke at most to interdependent con-
duct (which does not amount to an agreement).48  While the plaintiffs’
45 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554–55 (cataloguing prior decisions and noting “this case
presents the antecedent question of what a plaintiff must plead in order to state a claim”); see
also Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Dis-
guised) Summary Judgment Motions, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 62 (2007) (arguing the
Court’s analysis is “flawed . . . . In reality, Twombly III was a disguised motion for summary
judgment . . . .”).  Other scholars agree that the Court’s analysis in Twombly is flawed, but
many, unlike Professor Epstein, believe the wrong result was reached. See, e.g., Amy Wilder-
muth, What Twombly and Mead Have in Common, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 276, 280
(Apr. 11, 2008) (describing a “spinning sensation” on reading Twombly).
46 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546.  Scholars interested in civil procedure have been under-
standably befuddled by the various terms used to describe the appropriate probability of illegal
conduct based on the allegations in the complaint.  The Supreme Court settled on “plausibil-
ity,” but the Second Circuit had used “plausible possibility.”  Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,
425 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir.
2001)) (applying a plausibility test to market definition by stating that “conspiracy must be
among the range of plausible possibilities”).  The distinction between “plausible inference”
and “plausible possibility” is latent, if it exists at all.  The inability to draw helpful conclusions
from the terminology used demonstrates the need to understand Twombly from the perspective
of substantive antitrust law rather than civil procedure standards. See Brunet, supra note 44, at R
511 (stating that Twombly “only makes sense if characterized as a matter of substantive anti-
trust law”).
47 The approach of addressing plaintiffs’ allegations singly might be inappropriate. See
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962) (holding that
“plaintiffs should be given the full benefit of their proof without tightly compartmentalizing
the various factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of each”).  If Twombly
does depart from Continental Ore, because the earlier case arose at the directed verdict stage
of litigation, Twombly, in treating the allegations individually, might be thought to require a
stronger demonstration at the motion to dismiss stage than at later stages of litigation.
48 The district court had recognized independent explanations for some of the observed
conduct.  The district court noted that the service markets took the shape they did as a result of
historical accident during the period of regulated monopoly in local telephone service. See
Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 182–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  It also re-
jected the inference of agreement the plaintiffs drew from the defendants’ acting in parallel
fashion in refusing to be hospitable to new entry.  That conduct would be in each defendant’s
unilateral best interest.  The fact that they all did it, then, did not support an inference of an
agreement. See id. at 184.  There was also an independent explanation for the defendants’
mutual failures to enter into competition.  The district court and the Supreme Court recognized
the fundamentally different nature of the business model of a new entrant competitor from that
of an incumbent telephone service provider.  Each defendant had an independent reason not to
enter other service markets as a new entrant because its business was not structured such that
the firm would be likely to succeed in competing as a new entrant.  Success at one endeavor
did not guarantee success at the other. See id. at 185–87; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
568–69.
The theory of interdependence recognizes that firms that are not monopolists make deci-
sions with an eye toward the expected impact of their decisions on their competitors. See
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 430 (5th ed. 2001).  The law
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allegations were not inconsistent with a conspiracy, they did not exclude
the possibility of unilateral conduct.49  The allegations, therefore, did not
create a plausible inference.  The plaintiffs’ other allegations were en-
tirely neutral with regard to the question of agreement.  A plausible infer-
ence requires more.
What was missing in Twombly was an allegation that was anything
other than purely neutral as to whether the defendants had conspired.
Such an allegation could be direct— “the defendants met in a hotel room
in Des Moines”—or circumstantial—“the observed conduct could not
have occurred but for an agreement.”  The plaintiffs made neither form
of permissible allegation.  Therefore, the agreement element of the § 1
claim was not sufficiently pleaded.
At bottom, Twombly was about the burden of defending against pri-
vate antitrust claims.  For that reason as well, Dura Pharmaceuticals is
its natural progenitor.  The concern for undue burden in private claims
has a long history in private securities litigation, reaching as far back as
Blue Chip Stamps.
C. Iqbal
The Court recently clarified that the Twombly standards are not
unique to antitrust cases.  The imposition of an undue burden on defend-
ants from discovery in spurious cases—a driving concern underlying
Twombly—is not unique to the false positive concerns that underlie mod-
ern antitrust courts’ skepticism with regard to private claims.  The re-
quirement of pleading substantive law, which Twombly borrowed from
Dura Pharmaceuticals, carries over into other legal arenas. Iqbal offers
a fresh take on the application of the Rule 8 standard.
on interdependence was well established decades before the Twombly litigation began.  The
rule is also solidly grounded in antitrust economics, although Richard Posner famously dis-
agrees. See MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 52–55 (2006) (not-
ing the challenges of remedying tacit collusion: “Can we tell them ‘Do not tacitly collude’?  Or
‘Do not make your pricing decisions with regard to what your rivals do’?” (citing Donald F.
Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Re-
fusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962)); James A. Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust
Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743 (1950) (noting practical problems with attacking consciously paral-
lel conduct as conspiratorial, which ultimately leads to prosecutions based on mere structure
rather than conduct); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962) (noting the chal-
lenges of remedying conscious parallelism). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW
55–60 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing it is possible to outlaw and to remedy tacit collusion); Richard
A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562
(1969). See generally KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW 74–89 (2005) (critiquing the argu-
ments from Rahl to Posner).
49 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554 (finding no “factual context suggesting agreement, as dis-
tinct from identical, independent action”).
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Iqbal presents a dramatic extension of Twombly’s principles.
Twombly required a plaintiff to plead facts about conduct that were best,
if not uniquely, knowable to the defendants themselves. Iqbal requires a
plaintiff to plead facts about personal motivation that may be known only
to the defendants.50
1. The Story of Iqbal
In Iqbal, Muslim men including the named-plaintiff Iqbal sued then-
Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller, alleg-
ing mistreatment following the September 11th attacks.51  The complaint
alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller had each violated the plaintiffs’ consti-
tutional rights through purposeful discrimination on the basis of a prohib-
ited characteristic, whether race (Arab), religion (Muslim), or national
origin (Pakistani).52  Iqbal alleged that Ashcroft was the “principal archi-
tect” of a discriminatory policy and that Mueller was “instrumental.”53
The complaint alleged that together they “knew of, condoned, and will-
fully and maliciously agreed” to mistreat Iqbal for discriminatory reasons
lacking any “legitimate penological interest.”54
In order to prevail on this cause of action, Iqbal was required to
plead, and ultimately to prove, that the defendants “acted with discrimi-
natory purpose.”55  To prove that the defendants had acted with discrimi-
natory purpose, Iqbal would have to prove that the actions of Ashcroft
and Mueller were undertaken because of his membership in a protected
class.56
The Supreme Court held that Bivens actions do not create respon-
deat superior liability,57 unlike in antitrust law.  Ashcroft and Mueller
must have acted each, individually with an impermissible purpose.  It
would not be sufficient to allege that they were liable for conduct of their
subordinates.58 Bivens actions are also subject to the defense of qualified
immunity, which shields government officials from personal damages li-
ability and suit, so long as the alleged conduct does not violate clearly
established constitutional rights.59
50 Unlike antitrust claims, the civil rights claims in Iqbal do not permit respondeat supe-
rior liability.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).  Thus, a suit against an individ-
ual must be based on the individual’s conduct, which may be known only to him or her.
51 See id. at 1942.
52 See id. at 1943–44.
53 Id. at 1944 (2009) (quoting Complaint ¶¶ 10, 11).
54 Id. (Complaint ¶ 96).
55 Id. at 1948 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
540–41 (1993), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)).
56 Id.
57 See id. at 1949.
58 Id. at 1949.
59 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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2. Iqbal’s Analysis of Twombly
The Court in Iqbal identified “two working principles” in
Twombly.60 The first principle the Court identified was the prohibition
against pleading legal conclusions.61  That principle is noncontrover-
sial.62  The second principle is that in order to survive the motion to
dismiss, the claim for relief must be plausible in light of the facts alleged.
That requirement finds support in Rule 8’s requirement that the com-
plaint “show” entitlement to relief.63  Once legal conclusions are dis-
carded, the well-pleaded facts must “plausibly suggest” unlawful
conduct.64  Commentators have treated the plausibility rule with substan-
tial disdain.65  What precisely constitutes a “plausible” showing, rather
than the insufficient “possibility”66 or the unnecessary “probability,”67 is
unknowable.
Iqbal explained that Twombly held the complaint insufficient be-
cause the nonconclusory allegations of parallel conduct were “not only
compatible with, but indeed [were] more likely explained by, lawful, un-
choreographed free-market behavior.”68  In analyzing the complaint, the
Iqbal majority discarded the conclusory allegations.  It then posed a
choice between two competing rationales for the observed disparate im-
pact of post-September 11th detention policies.  The first proffered ratio-
60 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
61 Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see also Tal v.
Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006); DM Research, Inc. v. College of American
Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1999); Sutliff, Inc. v. Donavan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th
Cir. 1984); Heart Disease Research Found. v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir.
1972); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 999
(2003) (“Broad statements of legal conclusion do not meet the pleading requirements under the
Federal Rules . . . .”); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986) (noting “a number of areas in which courts refuse
to accept ‘conclusory’ allegations as sufficient under the Federal Rules”). See generally
Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy Claims, supra
note 7, at 640–41 (canvassing authorities interpreting the prohibition on conclusory allegations R
post-Twombly).
62 Charles E. Clark, the principal drafter of the Federal Rules and a proponent of the
notice pleading standard, considered it “settled” that “the pleader shows the facts and the court
applies the legal conclusion.”  Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case”, 21
F.R.D. 45, 52 (1957).  Commentators have, however, argued that the Federal Rules endorse
legal conclusions in certain circumstances. See Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV.  IN BRIEF 121, 141 (2007) (noting conclusory
allegations of “negligence” and “recklessness” were specifically endorsed by Form Complaints
9 and 10 to the Federal Rules); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV.
431, 442 (2008) (same).
63 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
64 See id.
65 See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 62, at 460–89. R
66 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (finding “mere possibility” insufficient).
67 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (stating that the Supreme
Court “does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage”).
68 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
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nale was Iqbal’s preferred inference: Ashcroft and Mueller, individually
or collectively,69 intended to discriminate against Arab Muslim men,
thus amounting to a constitutional violation.70  Another possibility was
that a post–September 11th detention policy, purely neutral toward race,
religion, and national origin, would present the same observed disparate
impact because, as the Supreme Court noted:
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab
Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in
good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist
group.  Al Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim—
Osama bin Laden—and composed in large part of his
Arab Muslim disciples.  It should come as no surprise
that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to ar-
rest and detain individuals because of their suspected
link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental
impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the
policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.71
The Court preferred the latter, “obvious alternative explanation.”72
3. A Dissenting View
Justice Souter, the author of Twombly, dissented in Iqbal.  He be-
lieved that the substantive legal principle of no supervisory liability, on
which the Court relied, was erroneous.73  Under Souter’s position, alle-
gations of fact giving rise to a plausible inference of individual discrimi-
natory animus on the parts of Ashcroft and Mueller would be
unnecessary.  Due to their disagreement about the question of supervi-
sory liability, the majority and the dissent in Iqbal are somewhat like
ships passing in the night with regard to the meaning of Twombly.
Justice Souter did, however, argue that the majority had misapplied
Twombly.  He believed the allegations that Ashcroft was the “principal
architect” of the discriminatory policies, that Mueller was “instrumental
in the[ir] adoption,” and that the two “knew of, condoned, and wilfully
and maliciously agreed to subject” plaintiff to conditions of confinement
“solely on account of his race, religion and/or national origin and for no
69 Unlike the § 1 claim at issue in Twombly, nothing about the Bivens action in Iqbal
turns on the existence of a conspiracy between Ashcroft and Mueller.  Unilateral discrimina-
tory motive on the part of either official would be a basis for a Bivens claim against that
official.
70 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1951–52.
73 Id. at 1957–58 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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legitimate penological interest” were sufficient to meet the Twombly
pleading standard.74
Reading the dissent compels the question of why Justice Souter
found a bare assertion of “conspiracy” insufficient to meet the Rule 8
standard in Twombly, yet found the bare assertion of “malicious intent”
sufficient in Iqbal.  The assertions in each case are legal conclusions.
The best explanation lies in the complexity of the concept of conspiracy
in antitrust cases, in contrast to the relative simplicity of the concept of
discriminatory motive in civil rights cases.  The assertion that defendants
conspired gave insufficient notice to the Twombly defendants of the con-
duct in which they, or their agents, were supposed to have engaged.  A
charge of conspiracy invokes a functionally infinite number of different
factual scenarios where large organizational defendants, acting through
agents, are concerned.  In the antitrust context, it also invokes difficult
and unsettled legal questions of what forms of coordinated conduct in an
oligopoly setting actually meet the legal standard of conspiracy.  Con-
versely, allegations that actions were motivated solely by race, religion,
or national origin do not involve such factual or legal complexity.75
4. Overreaching
Iqbal went further than Twombly on a surface level because
Twombly could reasonably be thought limited, prior to Iqbal, to antitrust
claims generally, or even to antitrust conspiracy claims specifically.
Iqbal now has clarified that Twombly applies equally to all federal civil
litigation.76 Iqbal also outpaced Twombly because, given the lack of re-
spondeat superior liability and the consequent reliance on the defendants’
individual motives, the information necessary to establish Iqbal’s claims
was more likely to be uniquely held by the individual defendants from
whom discovery is not allowed.  The information necessary to plead the
plaintiff’s claim was semi-public in nature due to the Twombly defend-
ants’ organizational structures.  Statements made by a disgruntled or
loose-lipped employee would be sufficient for plaintiffs to make their
allegations.77
Iqbal also extended the application of the plausibility standard from
a substantive legal subject area in which decades of economic research
have shaped the substantive rule of law to one in which defendants’ sub-
74 Id. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting).
75 This “conclusory” allegation posed by the Bivens action in Iqbal is thus most closely
comparable to the allegation of “negligence” expressly approved in Form 9 to the Federal
Rules. See Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy
Claims, supra note 7, at 640–41. R
76 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
77 Allegations of a Sherman Act § 1 conspiracy between sole proprietors would present a
more precise analogy to the circumstance of Iqbal.
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jective motivations are insufficiently understood.  The Twombly Court
relied on economic teachings, which remain largely undisturbed in mod-
ern literature:78 rational, profit-maximizing competitors, faced with an
oligopolistic marketplace, and who have been granted monopoly service
territories by past government policy, are likely to unilaterally decide not
to enter into direct competition.  The Supreme Court received support for
that proposition via scholarly writings and amicus curiae briefs submitted
in the litigation by antitrust law scholars and economists.79  Those eco-
nomic principles had become part of the substantive rule of law in anti-
trust conspiracy cases decades before Twombly was decided.80
No such deep social science authority supported the conclusion in
Iqbal that “as between that ‘obvious alternative explanation’ [of simple,
disparate impact of a neutral policy] . . . and the purposeful, invidious
discrimination respondent asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausi-
ble conclusion.”81  The Supreme Court in Iqbal did not cite any psycho-
logical, sociological, or penological studies regarding government
officials’ subjective motivations for detention policies in the wake of cat-
aclysmic events.82 Iqbal’s most dramatic extension of Twombly is the
Supreme Court’s appropriation of the power to conclude for itself which
inferences, to be drawn from observed facts, are “plausible” and which
are not.
78 But see Maurice Stucke, Behavioralists at the Gate, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (2007)
(arguing that behavioral economics suggests likely rationales for corporate conduct other than
unilateral profit maximization).
79 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Petitioners, 8–9, Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 2506633; Brief for Legal
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 2474080; 6 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1410a (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter AREEDA & HOVENKAMP] ; 2 JOSEPH P.
BAUER & WILLIAM H. PAGE, KINTNER’S FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 11.5 (2d ed. 2002).
80 See generally Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Con-
spiracy Claims, supra note 7, at 645–57 (discussing the adoption of economic principles in § 1 R
conspiracy claims from 1954 through 1993).
81 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951–52.
82 The historical data and scholarship presented to the Supreme Court in Iqbal rather
supports the view that plaintiff Iqbal’s allegations of race, religion and national-origin-based
animus were plausible.  One amici brief noted that racial animus historically motivated deten-
tion policies analogous to those complained of in Iqbal.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Japanese-
American Citizens League et al. in Support of Respondents at 13–15, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 4805228 (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943)) (noting historical support for an understanding of disparate impact of deten-
tion policies following national crises being based on animus rather than race or national ori-
gin-neutral security concerns); see also Nelson Lund, The Conservative Case Against Racial
Profiling in the War on Terrorism, 66 ALB. L. REV. 329 (2003).  Lund discussed public opin-
ion polls strongly supporting racial profiling of Arab men post September 11, id. at 330 & nn.
6–7, the ineradicable nature of racial profiling in human interactions and the inability of gov-
ernments (as distinct from the private sector) to rely on market forces to overcome it, id. at
332–33, 335–38; and Hirabayashi and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) as
examples of government misuse of racial profiling, id. at 339–40.
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D. Unifying Rationales
The pleading standards set forth in Iqbal and Twombly share the
unifying rationale that avoidance of litigation per se—independent of any
resulting liability—is a sufficiently worthy goal to restrict court access to
plaintiffs.  A concern for the potential chilling effect on firms’ beneficial
conduct that could be caused by over-enforcement by private plaintiffs
was crucial to Twombly and its antitrust and securities law ancestry.83
The Twombly Court devoted much of its opinion to a discussion of the
importance of avoiding burdensome discovery in private Sherman Act
litigation.84  That concern has manifested itself in private antitrust cases
since the Supreme Court’s 1983 Associated General Contractors opin-
ion, which noted in a footnote that the “massive factual controversy” at
issue gave the district court power to “insist on greater specificity in the
pleadings.”85  The Twombly Court cited several sources for the proposi-
tion that discovery in antitrust litigation is extraordinarily expensive and
noted the decades-old dictum imported from private securities litigation
that expensive discovery increases settlement value disproportionately to
the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.86
83 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 556–60 (2007) (regarding the
problem of false positives and concerns about abusive discovery: “proceeding to antitrust dis-
covery can be expensive”).  This concern may be limited to private antitrust enforcement. Cf.
Daniel Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1, 38–40 (2008) (arguing that the
“pathology” of excessive reliance on private litigation in antitrust undermines just outcomes
and overwhelms public enforcement); Max Huffman, Bridging the Divide? Theories for Inte-
grating Competition Law and Consumer Protection, 6 EUR. COMPETITION J. 7, 23–25 (2010)
(discussing the differences between private and public enforcement).
84 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 n.6.  This portion of the Court’s opinion in Twombly has
been roundly criticized on several grounds.  The Court relied on securities law precedents in
articulating its concern that discovery can be abusive and out of proportion to the merits.  The
Court failed, however, to draw the necessary link between securities and antitrust claims, ex-
cept for listing several authorities that described antitrust discovery in qualitative terms, and
considering it “obvious enough” that discovery will be “sprawling, costly, and hugely time-
consuming.”  The Court did not rely on quantitative analysis of discovery expense in antitrust
suits, which does not appear to exist in current literature.
85 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 528 n.17 (1983).  Earlier examples of concern for discovery expense in antitrust litigation
are not readily known, but hostility to private litigation has its roots in the neo-classical eco-
nomic revolution in antitrust that took root in the 1970s and was given the Supreme Court’s
imprimatur in a series of cases in 1977, including Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, 429
U.S. 477 (1977) and Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
86 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–60 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 741 (1975), and cases and commentators speaking about discovery expense in anti-
trust cases).  The concern for “blackmail settlements” in private litigation has a long pedigree.
See, e.g., HENRY FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 120 (1973) (citing Milton Handler, The
Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—the Twenty-Third Anti-
trust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971)) (expressing the concern that civil class-action
litigation “produce[s] blackmail settlements”).  In the securities arena, discovery expense was
one of the driving factors behind legislation limiting private rights of action.
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Even Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, who dissented in Twombly, ac-
cepted the Court’s portrait of the realities of antitrust litigation: “Private
antitrust litigation can be enormously expensive, and there is a risk that
jurors may mistakenly conclude that evidence of parallel conduct has
proved that the parties acted pursuant to an agreement . . . .”87  Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg believed those concerns warranted care in case
management but not a departure from settled procedures for pleading and
proving cases.
Iqbal turned on special concerns for harm from forcing government
defendants to undergo burdensome litigation, including “disruptive dis-
covery.”88  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that
“[l]itigation . . . exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure
of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the
proper execution of the work of the Government.”89  Like the antitrust
claim in Twombly and the private securities claims in cases such as Dura
Pharmaceuticals, on which Twombly relied, the Bivens action in Iqbal
was held to present a sufficiently intolerable risk of harm from litigation
to justify restrictions on plaintiffs’ access to federal courts.90  Such suspi-
cion of suits against government officials, particularly in law enforce-
ment or security settings, also has a long history.91  Reliance on motions
to dismiss to protect against the threat of social harm from excessive
private enforcement is well established in the civil rights arena, perhaps
even more than in the context of commercial torts.92  Part II develops a
framework for application of these unifying rationales for heightened
pleading standards to all civil claims in federal court.
87 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
88 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Sieg-
ert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991)) (expressing concerns about abusive discovery).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Cf. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498–99 (1896) (stating, in a suit against high-
ranking postal officer, “It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of
public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to
any such restraint.  He may have legal authority to act, but he may have such large discretion
in the premises that it will not always be his absolute duty to exercise the authority with which
he is invested.  But if he acts, having authority, his conduct cannot be made the foundation of a
suit against him personally for damages, even if the circumstances show that he is not disa-
greeably impressed by the fact that his action injuriously affects the claims of particular
individuals.”).
92 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808 (1982) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 507–08 (1978)) (“Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts
alert to the possibilities of artful pleading.  Unless the complaint states a compensable claim
for relief . . . it should not survive a motion to dismiss.”).
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II. APPLYING THE TWOMBLY/IQBAL FRAMEWORK TO DIFFERENT
TYPES OF FACTS
The pleading standard of Rule 8 controls a plaintiff’s access to later
stages of the litigation process.  Those later stages include the answer,
discovery, summary judgment motions, trial, post-trial motions, and ap-
peal.  The parties, the court, and the fact-finder gain access to informa-
tion about the contested facts at those later stages.  All other things being
equal, more information about contested facts will result in a more accu-
rate determination about the validity of a claim.  In a perfect world we
would have instant and free access to information about the validity of
the plaintiff’s claim, without compromising a defendant’s legitimate con-
cern for the privacy and security of its sensitive information.  In such a
world, invalid claims would be identified and instantly dismissed.  Valid
claims would be quickly vindicated.93  However, the imperfection ex-
isting in the real world includes the fact that information has costs and is
never certain. Rule 8’s pleading standard can be used to address those
imperfections.  Rule 8’s standard is designed to attempt to identify when
the benefits of moving a case to later stages of litigation outweigh the
costs.94
A. False Positive Error Can Result from Denying a Motion to
Dismiss
Some litigation costs are easy to spot.  Going forward with discov-
ery, motion practice, trial, and appeal involves attorneys’ fees, expert
expenses, and time.  Other costs of moving a case past the complaint
stage by denying a motion to dismiss are real but less obvious.  One cost
of moving a case past the complaint stage is the risk that the litigation
will result in false positive error.  A false positive occurs when a nonmer-
itorious claim results in an award or a settlement for the plaintiff.  The
easiest false positive to understand is an erroneous judgment for the
plaintiff following trial and appeal.  The litigation process is not perfect
and sometimes results in erroneous judgments.  Not surprisingly, some of
those erroneous judgments are for plaintiffs.
A less obvious false positive occurs when a defendant facing a non-
meritorious claim settles with the plaintiff.  A defendant facing a non-
93 Cf. Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 114–16
(2009) (making an economic defense of notice pleading, and comparing the “net social welfare
decrease[ ]”—where plaintiffs cannot bring claims because of lack of necessary information to
meet the pleading standard—with the “economic costs” of notice pleading).
94 Rule 8 includes sub-part 8(e), which instructs courts: “All pleadings shall be so con-
strued as to do substantial justice.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e). See Huffman, The Necessity of
Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy Claims, supra note 7, at 644–45 (interpret- R
ing Rule 8(e) to grant courts discretion to consider complaints more deeply than the concept of
“notice pleading” suggests is appropriate).
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meritorious claim must confront the likely expenses of defending—
attorneys’ fees, expert expenses, and its employees’ time.  It must also
face the possibility that even if it fully litigates the matter, it might still
end up losing because the litigation process is imperfect.  Given those
expense considerations, it may be rational for the defendant to settle non-
meritorious claims.95
A third manifestation of false positive error occurs when potential
defendants are deterred from engaging in desirable activity because of
the threat of litigation.  Recognizing ex ante the danger of incurring dis-
covery expenses and possible liability, defendants are motivated to keep
well short of the line that separates legal from illegal conduct.  In es-
chewing legal conduct that may give rise to litigation, defendants dumb-
down their conduct to their own, and society’s, detriment.  That, too, is a
cost of false positive error.
The detriment to society caused by false positive error is a product
of two factors: (1) whether a false positive error is very likely to occur in
a particular setting and (2) if a false positive error does occur, whether it
will be very costly.  Both of those variables, likelihood and cost, vary
depending on the area of substantive law involved.  In the next sub-Part,
we show that both Twombly and Iqbal involve areas of substantive law
where the cost of false positive error, when it occurs, is high.
95 Of course, false negative error may also occur even when the plaintiff survives a
motion to dismiss.  A fully litigated case might result in an erroneous judgment for the defen-
dant following trial.  Further, the same settlement calculus that affects defendants facing non-
meritorious claims affects plaintiffs asserting meritorious claims.  In fact, empirical research
on the decision-making bias of “loss aversion” suggests that false negative error due to settle-
ment is more likely than is false positive error. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses and
the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 144 (1996) (presenting empirical re-
search demonstrating that plaintiffs are risk averse in settlement negotiations while defendants
are risk-seeking).  Due to their risk aversion, plaintiffs may settle a case for less than the full
remedy that would be available from fully litigating the claim or even abandon a case without
settlement.  The plaintiff faces attorneys’ fees and related expenses that, in many situations,
will not result in a fee award.  Also, the plaintiff with a meritorious claim must face the possi-
bility that even if it fully litigates the claim, the litigation process is not perfect and may result
in the plaintiff’s erroneously losing.
The Rule 8 pleading standard creates another possibility for false negatives, beyond the
possibility that a fully litigated case may result in an erroneous judgment and the usual settle-
ment calculus.  If Rule 8’s pleading standard is not satisfied, the case will be dismissed on a
12(b)(6) motion.  This is so even if further litigation would have revealed that the plaintiff’s
claim is meritorious.  For example, in Twombly it is possible that employees of the defendant-
telecommunications company actually met somewhere and expressly agreed to divide the
country into noncompetitive territories.  Because a 12(b)(6) motion was granted, the defend-
ants were not even required to file an answer denying that such an express agreement existed,
much less answer questions about that possible agreement under oath. See Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  If such an agreement had
actually taken place, the Court’s terminating the plaintiff’s case yielded a false negative.  An
analogous possibility exists in Iqbal. But working within the parameters the Court established
in Twombly and Iqbal, this paper focuses on the cost of false positives rather than false
negatives.
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B. False Positive Error is Costly in Antitrust and Civil Rights Claims
False positive error in antitrust over-deters efficient, legal behav-
ior.96  False positives under § 1 of the Sherman Act,97 which prohibits
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade, can occur in several ways.
An erroneous judgment or settlement for the plaintiff may occur if an
agreement among the defendants did not exist and the concerted action
element is not satisfied.  Alternatively an error could occur in the appli-
cation of the reasonableness element of § 1.  An erroneous application of
the reasonableness element might occur if a per se rule—which outlaws
agreements regardless of their effects—was applied to the defendants’
behavior, when analysis under the “rule of reason” would reveal that the
defendants’ behavior was competitively neutral or pro-competitive.98  An
error in the application of the reasonableness element could also occur
under the rule of reason, which requires an inquiry into the net competi-
tive effect of the agreement at issue.  A false positive error could occur if
the defendants’ behavior was competitively neutral or net pro-competi-
tive but nonetheless was the basis for a settlement or verdict.  Under any
of those scenarios, the defendants’ behavior was lawful, but a false posi-
tive could occur if the defendants settled or suffered an erroneous
judgment.
Such false positive error involves wealth transfers from the defend-
ants to the plaintiffs, and the expenditure of resources by all parties in the
litigation.  However, the prospect of litigation can also lead to over-de-
terrence of lawful, efficient behavior.  Such over-deterrence is most eas-
ily seen in analyzing the reasonableness element of a rule of reason
claim.  If firms could be confident that the competitive effects of their
agreements would always be quickly, cheaply and accurately determined
in litigation, they would engage in efficient, lawful agreements and avoid
inefficient, unlawful agreements.  However, the prospect of litigation can
cause firms to avoid agreements that might be erroneously condemned,
either by erroneous judgments or settlements.  This deprives the econ-
omy of the benefits of the efficient agreements.99  It is important to rec-
ognize that the loss of efficient agreements occurs even though the firms
might never have been sued for their participation in the agreements, and
even if they had been sued, a false positive would not have occurred.
Over-deterrence due to potential false positives thus affects all firms con-
96 See William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1445, 1452–53 (1985).
97 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
98 See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
99 It also undermines firms’ incentives to refrain from engaging in inefficient, unlawful
agreements because both good and bad agreements are equally impacted if litigation does not
predictably condemn only wrongful conduct.
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templating agreements, along with all economic activity that depends on
their conduct.
The costs to the economy caused by false positive error involving
the agreement element of Sherman Act § 1 claims are less obvious.  A
false positive involving the agreement element would occur when a judg-
ment or settlement for the plaintiff occurs even in the absence of an
agreement.  This is the false positive that concerned the Court in
Twombly. Had the litigation in Twombly proceeded past the complaint
stage, the defendants might have been tempted to settle even if they had
not actually entered into an agreement dividing the nation into noncom-
petitive territories in violation of the per se rule against horizontal market
allocation.100
How would such a false positive over-deter lawful, unilateral behav-
ior?  One paradox of Twombly is that the Court failed to identify exactly
what behavior firms in a situation similar to the defendants would avoid
due to a fear of litigation.  Such firms might avoid any contact with com-
petitors out of a fear that they will be erroneously determined to be in an
agreement.  It is possible that such contact would create pro-competitive
effects if it had occurred.  It is also possible that firms will avoid entering
into pro-competitive agreements out of a fear that they will be errone-
ously accused or found to have entered into additional anticompetitive
agreements.101
False positive error can also occur in the context of § 2 of the Sher-
man Act, which prohibits monopolization.102  A monopolization offense
has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power and (2) the
acquisition or maintenance of that power by unlawful conduct.  An erro-
neous judgment or settlement for the plaintiff may occur if the defendant
did not possess monopoly power or had not engaged in conduct giving
rise to liability under § 2.  The cost of over-deterrence is especially obvi-
ous in the context of the conduct element.  Firms that possess monopoly
power must regularly make decisions that could negatively affect their
competitors.  Fear of litigation may cause a monopolist to keep prices
high, reduce production, and avoid efficiently bundling its products or
efficient exclusive arrangements with its customers or suppliers.  Such
over-deterrence may prevent monopolists from operating efficiently.
Thus, litigation can over-deter efficient behavior both in the context of
§ 1 and § 2 causes of action.  Over-deterrence affects firms that might
never have been sued had they engaged in the deterred behavior.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 38–43. R
101 Cf. Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 592 F.3d 318, 319 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting
plaintiff’s claim that conceded joint-venture agreement was the basis for a secret and unlawful
price-fixing agreement).
102 See infra text accompanying notes 155–57. R
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The cost to society of false positive error is also high in the civil
rights context—as demonstrated by the claim addressed in Iqbal.  In or-
der to overcome a defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity, a plaintiff
in a Bivens action must establish that the defendants violated a clearly
established right.103  Even that stringent standard will produce false posi-
tive error if a plaintiff collects an erroneous judgment or non-merit-based
settlement.
Governmental officials, sometimes even at the highest levels, such
as the defendants Ashcroft and Mueller in Iqbal, concerned about litiga-
tion might avoid lawful conduct in the pursuit of a governmental interest.
Avoidance of lawful conduct by governmental officials does not merely
reduce the efficient functioning of private markets, it also impairs the
effective pursuit of society’s noneconomic interests. Iqbal itself ad-
dresses a dramatic example of that potential problem.  The defendants in
Iqbal were senior officials responding to a coordinated multi-pronged
attack that killed thousands of people.  They were trying to prevent fur-
ther attacks.  Society has a strong interest in preventing such attacks via
lawful policies.  If policies that could be lawful and effective are deterred
by fear of litigation, society’s interests are impaired.
C. Determining the Expected Cost of False Positive Errors
Merely concluding that false positive error in a particular area of
law is costly when it occurs, as it is in antitrust claims and in the civil
rights claim at issue in Iqbal, does not mean that such error results in a
significant detriment to society.  Such detriment occurs only if error is
particularly likely.  It is only when false positive error is both costly and
likely that it produces a significant social detriment.  We define that cir-
cumstance to be one in which there is a high expected cost of false posi-
tive error.104
False positives occur in at least three ways.  First, a trier of fact may
erroneously conclude that the elements of a cause of action are met.  Sec-
ond, a defendant facing a nonmeritorious claim may settle rather than
face the chance of an erroneous judgment, or especially burdensome dis-
covery.  Third, an actor may avoid certain conduct altogether because of
the danger of litigation.  The likelihood that all three false positives will
occur varies depending on the nature of the facts in controversy.  Further,
the nature of the facts in controversy varies with each element of the
substantive law involved.
103 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948–49 (2009).
104 Cf. Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 911 & n.169 (2009) (noting that false positive error is one component of
expected error cost).  Bone’s broader expected error-cost framework does not accommodate
the Iqbal and Twombly Courts’ narrow focus on false positive error.
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D. The Likelihood of False Positive Error is Greater If Discovery
Will Be Especially Burdensome
Some factual questions relate to facts that are known to more than
one person, while others relate to facts directly known only to one per-
son.  In a simple negligence claim arising from a car accident, for exam-
ple, more than one person knows some of the relevant facts.  Both the
plaintiff and the defendant know the time, date, and location of the acci-
dent.  Each party knows the condition of the roadway, the weather at the
time of the accident, what it observed about each car’s speed, direction of
travel prior to the accident, and the apparent condition of all parties after
the accident.  Third-party witnesses may have also observed some of
those facts.  But even in a simple car accident, some relevant facts are
known only to one person.  The extent of pain suffered by the plaintiff is
directly known only to the plaintiff.  Similarly, only the plaintiff knows
whether the pain has subsided over time.  Only the plaintiff knows the
extent to which the pain impairs his or her ability to work.105  Similarly,
only defendants know whether they saw the plaintiff’s car prior to collid-
ing with it, and only defendants know whether they took their eyes off
the road immediately prior to the accident.
Whether more than one person knows facts affects the likelihood of
false positive error.  If only one person knows facts, then the likelihood
that the trier of fact will commit an error increases.  The trier of fact has
only one direct source of information about the relevant fact, and that
source may be a party with an incentive to avoid revealing the fact.  Al-
ternatively, the source of the information may appear biased and there-
fore may be tainted in the eyes of the trier of fact.  In such a situation, the
trier of fact may reach an erroneous conclusion about the fact resulting in
a false positive or a false negative.  The possibility of an erroneous con-
clusion by the trier of fact may also induce the parties to settle.  The
settlement may result in a false positive or a false negative.  Moreover,
concern about error in litigation may impact the parties’ conduct outside
the litigation setting.  In the car accident example, driving is disincen-
tivized for the would-be defendants.
Whether facts are known to more than one person may also affect
the likelihood of error by affecting the extent and nature of discovery.  If
facts are known to both parties, then discovery is not likely to be espe-
cially burdensome.  In the car accident example, both parties know the
location of the accident.  The location of the accident will determine the
applicable speed limit.  No extensive discovery will be required to allow
105 Facts known only to the plaintiff increase the plaintiff’s litigation costs vis-a`-vis the
defendant.  Stancil, supra note 93, at 126.  Facts of that sort will increase the risk of false R
negative error. See supra note 94. R
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plaintiffs to prove that fact because they may testify to it.106  In contrast,
plaintiffs probably have no direct knowledge about whether defendants
adequately maintained their car prior to the accident.  Depositions and
document production may be appropriate to collect evidence about that
potentially relevant fact.  In more complex cases, there may be differ-
ences in the extent of discovery that is appropriate depending on who has
direct access to relevant facts.
This produces a paradox that the Supreme Court neither recognized
nor resolved in Iqbal and Twombly.  The less public the fact, the more
burdensome the discovery required to prove it.  Therefore, under Iqbal
and Twombly, a court’s initial inquiry into the complaint should be more
searching.  But because the fact is nonpublic, it is less likely the plaintiff
would be able to allege it in the complaint.107
In Twombly, the plaintiffs’ horizontal market allocation claim
hinged on whether employees of the largest telecommunications compa-
nies in the nation had entered into an express agreement to divide territo-
ries.108  The plaintiffs had no direct knowledge of the existence of such
an agreement.109  If the complaint had survived the motion to dismiss,
plaintiffs could have conducted discovery to find evidence of that agree-
ment to present at trial.  That discovery could have been very burden-
some.  Since the corporate defendants would have been liable for
agreements entered into by their employees, a large number of employ-
ees could have been deposed to determine if they had entered into any of
the forbidden agreements.110  In advance of those depositions, document
and electronic discovery regarding the travel and telephone records, and
paper and email correspondence, could have been appropriate.  Deter-
mining whether any of a large number of employees of one defendant
communicated with any of a large number of employees at any of several
other defendants’ offices is a daunting task.
106 Cf. Stancil, supra note 93, at 129–30 (risk of “cost arbitrage suits”—in which a ra- R
tional plaintiff will file a truly frivolous claim—increases with increases in the defendant’s
internal pretrial costs); id. at 133 (“[T]here is a real risk of frivolous suit in the perfect storm
. . . [w]hen cost disparity significantly favors the plaintiff.”).
107 See Stancil, supra note 93, at 133 (“This correlation presents a conundrum: the cases R
in which a stricter pleading standard is most justified on Type I error grounds are precisely the
cases in which a more liberal pleading standard is most justified on Type II error grounds.”).
108 See Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(“[A]bsent an agreement among competitors to restrain trade, anti-competitive behavior does
not violate § 1.”).
109 Amended Complaint para. 51, Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 02 CIV. 10220),
2003 WL 25629874 (alleging conspiracy “on information and belief”); id. paras. 37–50 (alleg-
ing circumstantial facts supporting the ultimate allegation of conspiracy).
110 The complexity of the concept of agreement also threatens further to complicate dis-
covery on that element, as it is difficult to know in advance what conduct is relevant to proving
agreement. See supra note 48; see also Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Pri- R
vate Antitrust Conspiracy Claims, supra note 7, at 645–57. R
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Iqbal involves another situation where the plaintiffs had no direct
knowledge of a relevant fact.  The plaintiff in Iqbal had no direct knowl-
edge about whether Attorney General Ashcroft and Director Mueller
possessed the required discriminatory intent.  Unlike Twombly, however,
there were not a large number of employees of a corporate defendant
who might have direct knowledge of the contested facts.  In Iqbal, unlike
Twombly, the doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply.111  There-
fore, only Ashcroft and Mueller knew whether they possessed the pro-
hibited discriminatory intent.
Like the plaintiff in Twombly, the plaintiff in Iqbal could not estab-
lish the contested fact based on his own testimony.  Discovery related to
discriminatory intent by Ashcroft and Mueller would not be limited
solely to their own depositions.  The plaintiff would likely also want to
review paper and electronic correspondence connected to Ashcroft and
Mueller.  Further, there were a number of subordinate governmental offi-
cials who were defendants in the case.112  It is possible that those defend-
ants, and other governmental officials who might be deposed as
witnesses, would testify that Ashcroft and/or Mueller knew of and agreed
with their actions.  Counsel for Ashcroft and Mueller would want to par-
ticipate in discovery to monitor that possibility.  Although the extent of
discovery relevant to possible discriminatory intent by Ashcroft and
Mueller would probably be less extensive than that related to the possible
anticompetitive agreement in Twombly, it would still be burdensome.113
The prospect of burdensome discovery increases the likelihood of
false positive error.  When discovery is likely to be especially burden-
some for the defendant, the incentive for the defendant to settle in-
creases.  That is so even if fully litigating the case would result in a
judgment for the defendant.  Even defendants who can confidently pre-
dict that they will win the case at trial have an increased incentive to
settle if discovery promises to be especially burdensome.  That increased
incentive to settle, which is caused by the prospect of burdensome dis-
covery, increases the likelihood of false positive error.
E. The Plausibility Standard Turns on the Expected Cost of False
Positive Error
The plausibility standard developed in Twombly and Iqbal is in-
tended to avoid false positive error.  Its application therefore must vary
depending on the expected cost associated with false positives on the
111 See supra text accompanying note 57. R
112 See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 WL 2357202, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005)
(listing defendants).
113 Iqbal superbly demonstrates the Twombly paradox: the less publicly available the fact,
the more specifically plaintiffs will be required to allege it.
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particular element of the claim in issue.  The first factor in the expected
cost of false positives calculus is whether the substantive area of law
involved is one where error is costly if it occurs.  That will depend on
whether false positives will over-deter especially important, beneficial
behavior.
The second factor in the expected cost calculus is whether error is
especially likely.  That will depend on whether discovery will be espe-
cially burdensome, which in turn depends on whether the contested facts
are public, quasi-public, or known only to the defendant.  In turn, that
will vary depending on which element of which claim is in contro-
versy.114  In a single claim, different elements might give rise to different
types of contested facts.  Therefore, the likelihood of false positives will
be a function of which element is in controversy.  The pleading standard
must vary, element-by-element, depending on the type of facts relevant
to making proof of each element.115
The strongest case for a high plausibility standard exists where the
expected cost of false positive error is great.  This is so when false posi-
tive error is both likely and costly.  This was the case in both Twombly
and Iqbal.  As discussed above, both cases involve substantive areas of
law where false positives are costly if they occur.  Also, the element
raising the pleading question in each case related to facts uniquely in the
hands of the defendants—the agreement issue in Twombly and the dis-
criminatory intent issue in Iqbal.  Each of those factual issues raised the
prospect of burdensome discovery, making false positives especially
likely.
Since both cases addressed situations where false positives are both
costly and likely, the Supreme Court has not faced a situation where one
or both of those variables has been different.  If either the cost or likeli-
hood of a false positive is low, the high plausibility standard applied in
Twombly and Iqbal is not justified.  Each element of each claim in each
area of substantive law needs to be examined to assess whether the high
plausibility standard applied in Twombly and Iqbal is justified.116  Anti-
114 “[S]everal claim types” are characterized by disparities in costs for plaintiffs and de-
fendants because “the range of permissible inquiry into defendant’s affairs increases as plead-
ing specificity requirements decreases, especially for claims in which the plaintiff’s own
conduct is of little moment.”  Stancil, supra note 93, at 116. R
115 See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text (discussing the lesson from Dura R
Pharmaceuticals that pleading is driven by the substantive elements of the claim).
116 We argue that the treatment of allegations at the motion to dismiss stage depends on
the expected cost of false positive error in litigation.  The impact of that rule, this Part demon-
strates, is disparate treatment of different elements of different claims, seemingly violating the
Rule 8 pleading standard’s trans-substantivity, which is implicit in the Leatherman rule. See
supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text.  Judge Posner implicitly approved that reality: R
The [Twombly] Court held that in complex litigation (the case itself was an antitrust
suit) the defendant is not to be put to the cost of pretrial discovery—a cost that in
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trust law provides an important context for applying the plausibility stan-
dard.  It is an area of law where false positives, if they occur, are costly.
In antitrust law, a plaintiff may make several types of claims, each of
which have several elements and raise different types of factual ques-
tions.  An analysis of antitrust law demonstrates how substantive law in-
teracts with the rationale for the plausibility standard in such a manner as
to raise pleading standards of different heights consistent with the ratio-
nale of mitigating expected costs of false positive error.
III. APPLYING THE TWOMBLY/IQBAL FRAMEWORK TO
ANTITRUST CLAIMS
In this Part we consider the elements of individual antitrust claims
within the framework developed in Part II.  That consideration enables us
to determine the appropriate application of Rule 8 to each claim.
The Sherman Act has two principal sections, section one117 and sec-
tion two.118  Each of those sections has two elements.  The first element
of a claim under § 1 is the existence of an agreement between two or
more actors.119  The second element of a claim under § 1 is that the
agreement must be in “unreasonable” restraint of trade.120
The first element of a monopolization claim under § 2 is that the
defendant has monopoly power.121  The second element requires that the
defendant acquire or preserve its monopoly power with prohibited con-
duct.122  A two-section statute giving rise to two discrete claims, each of
which has two elements, might seem simple to apply.  However, over
120 years, courts, litigants, and commentators have discovered that those
complex litigation is so steep as to coerce a settlement on terms favorable to the
plaintiff even when his claim is very weak—unless the complaint says enough about
the case to permit an inference that it may well have real merit.  The present case,
however, is not complex. . . . Iqbal is special in its own way, because the defendants
had pleaded a defense of official immunity and the Court said that the promise of
minimally intrusive discovery “provides especially cold comfort in this pleading
context.”
Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009).  Judge Posner makes the point that the
scope of review of a plaintiff’s allegations turns not on some labeling of claims, but on the
realities of false positive error with regard to certain kinds of claims.  It is thus possible, as we
have shown above, that a rule uniformly applied across different claims, even within a particu-
lar area of law, will mandate disparate treatment of those claims.
117 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
118 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
119 The agreement element arises from Section One’s requirement of a “contract, combi-
nation . . . or conspiracy.”  15 U.S.C. § 1.  This was the element in controversy in Twombly.
See supra text accompanying notes 37–49. R
120 See infra text accompanying notes 145–49. R
121 See infra text accompanying notes 154–62.  The statement in the text applies to a R
claim of actual monopolization.  Section Two also prohibits attempted monopolization and
conspiracies to monopolize.
122 See infra text accompanying notes 163–65. R
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four elements—individually and in combination— create a massively
complex body of law.  The complexity of the substantive law makes ana-
lyzing the pleading standard applicable to each element commensurately
complex.
Part II of this Article articulated the framework for applying the
Twombly/Iqbal standard to antitrust claims.  It demonstrates that one part
of the expected-cost inquiry—the cost of false positives where they oc-
cur—is high for antitrust claims, although there are differences among
claims depending on the particular conduct at issue.  In this Part we ana-
lyze the individual elements of the primary antitrust claims—both per se
and rule of reason claims under Sherman Act § 1 and monopolization
claims under Sherman Act § 2—under the expected-cost inquiry from
Part II.  We then go on in Part IV to analyze cases decided since
Twombly, and the relatively few cases decided since Iqbal, to determine
their fidelity to the correct rule.123
A. Conspiracies Restraining Trade
1. Agreement
A single actor cannot unilaterally violate § 1 of the Sherman Act.124
Section One requires an agreement between two separate actors.125
Whether such an agreement exists raises both factual and legal issues,
which have different impacts depending on whether the agreement is to
be proved directly or circumstantially.  Factual issues include such basic
questions as who talked to whom, when the parties talked, where they
talked, and what they said.  In Twombly, for example, it would be impor-
tant to know whether the chief executive officer of one defendant tele-
phone company telephoned the chief executive officer of another
defendant telephone company.  If such a telephone call occurred—with
the executives agreeing that the corporations would stay out of each
123 We do not examine other antitrust claims, including merger challenges under Clayton
Act Section Seven and secondary-line price discrimination claims under the Robinson-Patman
Act.  The former comprise a small portion of federal courts’ antitrust dockets and are even
more rarely the subject of private litigation. But see Paul Stancil, Atomism and the Private
Merger Challenge, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 949 (2005).  The latter are disfavored under most mod-
ern antitrust analyses.
124 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (“There is the
basic distinction between concerted and independent action—a distinction not always clearly
drawn by parties and courts.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires that there be a “contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy” between the manufacturer and other distributors in order to
establish a violation.  Independent action is not proscribed.”).
125 Persons within a single firm are deemed to be part of one actor for purposes of that
requirement. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (hold-
ing that a parent and a subsidiary corporation cannot conspire within the meaning of § 1).
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other’s territories—the call would constitute direct proof of an illegal
agreement under § 1.126
Even if the facts of an antitrust case are undisputed, whether those
facts add up to an agreement cognizable under the agreement element of
§ 1 raise conceptually complex legal questions.  The legal issues are sim-
ple at the margins.  If two parties expressly communicate, whether orally
or in writing, and agree about what one or both of them will do, the
communicated agreement will satisfy the first element of § 1.127  Simi-
larly easy is a case where two parties do not communicate with each
other and engage in independent conduct.  Conduct is independent when
it is profit-maximizing for one party regardless of the conduct of another
party.128  Such purely independent conduct does not constitute an agree-
ment for the purposes of § 1.129  A difficult conceptual question is
whether conduct which is neither the product of an express communi-
cated agreement, nor independent, constitutes an agreement for the pur-
poses of § 1.
Conduct by two parties is interdependent when its profit-maximiz-
ing nature for each party depends on the conduct of the other.  When two
parties are competitors, they might act like cartelists without ever com-
municating with each other and expressly agreeing.  They might raise
prices above the competitive level or stay out of each other’s territories
by virtue of their recognition that it is in their collective interest to do so.
In such a case, economists recognize the harm to competition would be
similar to that created by a communicated agreement.  However, in such
a case no communicated agreement would be present.  In Twombly, the
Supreme Court stated that such “mere interdependence” would not be
sufficient to establish an agreement under § 1, explaining that “[e]ven
‘conscious parallelism,’ a common reaction of ‘firms in a concentrated
market [that] recogniz[e] their shared economic interests and their inter-
dependence with respect to price and output decisions’ is  ‘not in itself
126 See supra note 39.  Such an overt agreement may be investigated and prosecuted crim- R
inally. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (stating that an agreement to restrain trade is a “felony”
carrying lengthy prison sentences and fines).
127 Such an agreement would, of course, be lawful under § 1 if it did not unreasonably
restrain trade. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
128 Cf. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY & PRO-
CEDURE: CASE AND MATERIALS 187 (5th ed. 2003).
129 See, e.g., Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540–42
(1954).
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unlawful.’”130  Thus, in pleading and proving an agreement under § 1,
the plaintiff must establish a communicated agreement.131
In many cases, if an agreement is established, the plaintiff wins.
This is so because some agreements are deemed to be unreasonable per
se.  Because there is no factual inquiry into the competitive effects of the
agreement in per se cases, the entire case turns on the agreement element.
“The per se rule, treating categories of restraints as necessarily illegal,
eliminates the need to study the reasonableness of an individual restraint
in light of the real market forces at work. . . .”132 Twombly reiterates that
a per se claim is functionally a single-element claim.  Successfully plead-
ing and proving the agreement element subjects the defendant to auto-
matic liability.  The second element—reasonableness of the restraint—is
foreordained as a matter of law.133
The error cost of a false positive in a per se claim is high.  An
erroneous finding of an agreement can subject the defendant to liability
for socially beneficial conduct.  If threatened with antitrust liability, a
firm might be disinclined to attend trade shows, where engineering and
marketing improvements—including cost savings, which in a competi-
130 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–54 (2007) (citing Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993)); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP supra note 79 ¶ R
1433a, (2d ed. 2003) (“The courts are nearly unanimous in saying that mere interdependent
parallelism does not establish the contract, combination, or conspiracy required by Sherman
Act § 1”); Turner, supra note 48, at 672 (“[M]ere interdependence of basic price decisions is R
not conspiracy”).
131 See William H. Page, Communication and Concerted Action, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J..
101, 101 (2007) (defining agreement by reference to the existence of actual communication
between the parties).  Professor Page applied his test post-Twombly, reading cases reviewing
the agreement element as turning on whether the plaintiff has alleged “communication” among
the defendants.  William H. Page, Twombly and Communication:  The Emerging Definition of
Concerted Action Under the New Pleading Standards, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 439,
459–64 (2009) [hereinafter Page, Twombly and Communication].  Page’s thoughtful analysis
holds in many post-Twombly cases analyzing allegations of agreement. See id. at 455–64.
That is consistent with our argument that a plaintiff seeking to prove conspiracy directly will
be required to plead with greater specificity because of the burden of discovery. See infra
notes 136–38 and accompanying text. R
132 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886–87 (2007).  A
per se rule reaches a generally applicable conclusion about the economic effect of a category
of behavior.  Per se rules thus require courts to make broad generalizations about the social
utility of particular commercial practices.  The probability that anticompetitive consequences
will result from a practice and the severity of those consequences must be balanced against the
practice’s pro-competitive consequences.  Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise,
but a per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important
to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them. See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
133 To be sure, legal arguments remain on whether particular conduct is, or is not, suffi-
ciently anticompetitive to warrant per se treatment.  However, those arguments do not impli-
cate the pleading analysis.
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tive marketplace inure to consumers’ benefit—may be discussed.134  The
firm might be disinclined to imitate product improvements implemented
by competitors, for fear of appearing to engage in parallel conduct.  The
firm might be disinclined to match price reductions implemented by
competitors for the same reason.135  The harm caused by disincentivizing
such potentially beneficial business conduct is antithetical to the antitrust
laws’ purpose of enhancing competition for the benefit of consumers.
The expected cost of false positive errors analysis next requires an
assessment of the likelihood of a false positive.  The likelihood of a false
determination of liability (or settlement) on the agreement element of a
§ 1 claim depends on the manner in which the agreement is to be pleaded
and proved.  A plaintiff can prove a conspiracy with direct evidence.
The Third Circuit, in Cosmetic Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneman Corp., de-
fined direct evidence as evidence that “evince[s] with clarity a concert of
illegal action.”136  The Third Circuit listed several examples, including
(1) a direct threat by one competitor to the plaintiff that competitors
would prevent plaintiff’s success; (2) a threat that a supplier would cut
off access if the distributor failed to maintain prices; (3) a memorandum
detailing the discussions of a group of conspirators; and (4) a public reso-
lution by conspirators.137
If a plaintiff relies on direct evidence of an agreement, it is rela-
tively simple to assess the pleadings and weigh the evidence.  However,
the evidence on which the plaintiff will rely is uniquely in the hands of
the defendant.  Unless the fact of an agreement was communicated to the
plaintiff or third parties—which is unlikely given the criminal liability
that attaches to per se violations of § 1138—discovery targeting direct
evidence of an agreement requires depositions and document discovery
of the defendant.  Where the defendant is an organization, in which mul-
tiple—perhaps hundreds or thousands of—individual agents are author-
ized to act on its behalf, the scope of such discovery threatens to be
massive.
Finally, such discovery is entirely one-sided.  Nothing about the sin-
gle contested element of a per se claim requires discovery from the plain-
tiff.  Such one-sided discovery presents a moral hazard problem.  If the
134 Cf. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (industry group
discussed costs of shipping product).
135 The error cost is amplified in the case of the per se rule because triers of fact do not
have the power to mitigate the harsh result of liability by declaring the conduct engaged in to
be “reasonable.”  If the agreement element is met, liability is automatic.
136 Cosmetic Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 52 (3d Cir. 2007).
137 Id. (citing cases). Cosmetic Gallery, which was decided on summary judgment, held
that the evidence was not sufficient directly to demonstrate a conspiracy. Id. at 53.
138 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (stating that violation is a felony punishable by up to ten
years in jail and $100,000,000 in fines).
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chances of a lucrative settlement are enhanced by burdensome discovery
of the defendant, and if there is no concern for tit-for-tat discovery, the
plaintiff is incentivized to make its discovery requests as burdensome as
possible.  For an allegation that the defendants, or their agents, met and
agreed, the threatened burden of discovery, and therefore the likelihood
of a false positive settlement, is high.139 Twombly dealt with that precise
circumstance.  The Twombly Court held that the threatened burden of
discovery warranted a searching analysis of the complaint.140
Circumstantial allegations of agreement present precisely the re-
verse situation.  As a matter of substantive law, a plaintiff relying on
circumstantial evidence should succeed in proving the agreement ele-
ment only if it can prove the observed conduct—usually parallel behav-
ior, which, as Twombly held, is innocent—would not have occurred but
for an agreement.141  If there is an equally plausible nonconspiratorial
explanation for the observed conduct, circumstantial proof will be insuf-
ficient.142  Exactly what observed conduct meets that standard is a com-
plex question best answered by those trained in economics, based on
observations of marketplace conduct that occurs in the public eye.
Although the legal analysis and its factual predicates are detailed,
complex, and commensurately expensive to undertake (requiring, at a
minimum, the parties retain economic experts), the burden on the defen-
dant of discovery relating to its own conduct in a circumstantial evidence
case is low.  The discovery burdens are not borne uniquely by the defen-
dant because the facts relevant to proving an agreement by circumstantial
evidence are as likely to be available from third parties throughout the
market as from the defendant.  Many relevant facts—for example, indus-
try pricing trends143 or product changes and marketing practices—will be
publicly available without resort to the discovery process.  The discovery
undertaken involves depositions of the other party’s expert witnesses, a
burden borne equally by the plaintiff and the defendant.  The moral haz-
ard created by asymmetric discovery expenses is not present in circum-
139 Of course, it remains possible that the plaintiff could simply make up a fact, rendering
even direct allegations of agreement unreliable.  Any such activity is the subject of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
140 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
141 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, & HOWARD A. SHELANSKI, ANTI-
TRUST LAW, POLICY & PROCEDURE 264 (6th ed. 2009) (describing circumstantial proof of
agreement by reference to a “but for” allegation); see, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 n.4
(discussing a historically unprecedented pattern of parallel pricing behavior).
142 We discuss here the standard for proving an agreement on the basis of circumstantial
evidence.
143 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.4 (noting that historical pricing patterns can be a
“plus factor” nudging innocent parallel conduct over the line to impermissible conspiratorial
conduct).
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stantial evidence cases.  For that reason, there is a reduced concern for
false positives in circumstantial evidence cases.
We have, then, with regard to per se claims, a dichotomous result.
Where agreement is to be proved by direct evidence, the expected cost of
the false positive error is high—it is costly if it occurs, and it is likely to
occur.  The importance of avoiding that cost is commensurately high, so
the specificity required of plaintiffs in pleading agreements by direct evi-
dence is high.  That is precisely the conclusion the Supreme Court
reached in Twombly.  Where agreement is to be proved by circumstantial
evidence, the expected cost of the false positive error is moderate.  It is
costly if it occurs, but it is unlikely to occur. Iqbal and Twombly are
properly read to teach that where proof is to be made by circumstantial
evidence, allegations of agreement may be pleaded with less specificity
than those to be proved by direct evidence.144
This dichotomy produces a surprising result.  In order to properly
evaluate a complaint alleging an agreement in violation of § 1 under the
rules announced in Iqbal and Twombly, a court must know whether the
plaintiff’s proof will be direct or circumstantial.  If the proof will be di-
rect, the plaintiff must create a sufficient plausible inference that an
agreement exists, based on observed facts, that the court will be willing
to subject the defendant to burdensome, one-sided discovery requests.
The plausibility rule mitigates the false positive concern by increasing
the likelihood that the defendant actually engaged in prohibited conduct.
But if the proof of agreement will be circumstantial, the two-sided and
less burdensome nature of discovery reduces the expected cost of false
positive error.  Thus, the need for specificity in the complaint is reduced.
It would therefore be understandable if courts required plaintiffs to com-
mit, when opposing a motion to dismiss, to one approach or another in
proving agreement.145
2. Reasonableness
Only agreements that “unreasonably” restrain trade violate § 1.146
Agreements not held to be per se illegal are judged under some form of
the “rule of reason.”  Sometimes the rule of reason is applied by thor-
oughly analyzing the pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects of an
agreement.  In other cases, the rule of reason is applied in a truncated
fashion, sometimes referred to as a “quick look” rule of reason.  Like a
144 It is in this circumstance that the purest form of the “notice” pleading standard should
be applied.
145 This approach would be consistent with a district court’s power to control discovery
and to permit only discovery likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
146 Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238–39 (1918).
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per se claim, a rule of reason claim often centers on only one element.
That is because, for a rule of reason claim, the fact of an agreement is
usually publicly known, so it is easy to plead and is not the subject of
argument on a motion to dismiss.  The contested element for the rule of
reason claim is usually the effect of the agreement.  As it does elsewhere,
the Twombly/Iqbal expected cost of false positive error governs the
pleading requirement.
The Supreme Court has not been clear about how the rule of reason
should be applied.  The rule is often phrased as an open-ended inquiry
into the reasonableness of the restraint on competition imposed by the
agreement.  In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., the Supreme
Court stated that “[u]nder this rule, the fact-finder weighs all of the cir-
cumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be
prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”147
The Supreme Court supported its statement by quoting one of the origi-
nal—and most famous—statements of the rule of reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed
is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby pro-
motes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition . . . .  The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopt-
ing the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to
be attained, are all relevant facts.148
The rule of reason has evolved into a structure of shifting burdens of
proof.  That structure improves its predictability.  The plaintiff bears the
initial burden of establishing that the challenged agreement is likely to
have anticompetitive effects.  The plaintiff may meet its initial burden in
one of two ways.  First, the plaintiff may meet its burden by engaging in
a full analysis of the effect of the restraint in the market—the so-called
“full blown” rule of reason.  Second, in cases of inherently suspect re-
straints, the plaintiff is able to meet its burden on a “quick look” basis
without a full analysis of the market.149  A full market analysis is com-
147 Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
148 Id. at 50 n.15.
149 The Supreme Court developed the quick look standard in a series of three cases. In
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), the govern-
ment sued to void an ethical cannon prohibiting competitive bidding.  The Court imposed the
burden on the defendant to demonstrate a pro-competitive justification without engaging in a
thorough analysis of the effect of the restraint on the market. Id. at 692–93.  In National
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, the Court held
that agreements that on their face restrained output and price were sufficient to establish the
likelihood of anticompetitive effects without a thorough market analysis or even a definition of
a relevant market or a demonstration of market power.  468 U.S. 85, 104–06 (1984).  In F.T.C.
v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, the Court imposed on the defendants the burden of estab-
lishing a pro-competitive justification without requiring the Federal Trade Commission to es-
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plex and expensive because it requires a definition of the applicable mar-
ket and an inquiry into how the challenged restraint affects that market.
Just as importantly, given the complexity of the analysis, the expense of
the analysis and the lack of predictability of the outcome of the analysis,
a potential plaintiff may not want to try to make the required showing.
Plaintiffs much prefer the lighter initial burden of production that the
quick look standard promises.
If the plaintiff makes the initial showing of potential anticompetitive
effect, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged restraint has offsetting, pro-competitive justifications.  If the de-
fendant establishes such pro-competitive justifications, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to establish that the anticompetitive effects outweigh
the pro-competitive justifications.  Theoretically, the rule of reason re-
quires a balancing of the anticompetitive effects and pro-competitive ef-
fects of the challenged restraint.  However, the balancing question never
arises if either party fails in its initial burden of production—if the plain-
tiff cannot demonstrate the required anticompetitive effect or if the de-
fendant fails thereafter to establish a pro-competitive justification.150
The likelihood of a false positive on the reasonableness element of a
full-blown rule of reason claim is low.  As with an agreement to be
proved by circumstantial evidence (discussed in the prior section), the
high burden and expense of litigating the issues of relevant market, likely
anticompetitive effects, and countervailing pro-competitive considera-
tions is a distraction.  For purposes of applying the Twombly/Iqbal stan-
dard, what is important is that proof of market effects of an agreement
generally will be available from sources other than the defendant.  The
discovery of the defendant that does take place is simpler as well.  Unlike
the secret agreement in a per se claim, a defendant in a rule of reason
case should know which of its agents was involved in the decisions being
challenged because those decisions are publicly known.  The true ex-
pense of litigation is preparing and taking expert testimony.  Those costs,
however, are borne equally by the plaintiff and by the defendant.  No
problematic asymmetries exist.
tablish the likelihood of anticompetitive effects by means of a thorough market analysis.  476
U.S. 447, 459 (1986).
150 The leading discussion of the respective burdens of the plaintiff and the defendants in
a rule of reason case is found in California Dental Association v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
California Dental reflects a debate between Justice Souter, writing for a five-justice majority,
and Justice Breyer in dissent.  The disagreement is about whether the plaintiff in a rule of
reason case must, in meeting its initial burden of establishing the likelihood of anticompetitive
effects, analyze possible pro-competitive effects of the challenged restraint. Id. at 771–76.
The answer to this question affects whether the claim can be analyzed on a quick-look basis.
Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court holds that the plaintiff must engage in an analysis of
possible pro-competitive effects of the agreement in bearing its initial burden of establishing
the likelihood of anticompetitive effects. Id.
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When bringing a quick-look claim, the plaintiff is traditionally per-
mitted to rely on an assertion of harm.  The defendant is then required to
respond with pro-competitive justifications, before the plaintiff bears the
ultimate burden of proving that the harm to competition outweighs any
possible pro-competitive justifications for the restraint.  Unlike with the
full-blown rule of reason, the plaintiff’s initial burden, traditionally con-
ceived, is merely to demonstrate the existence of a suspect agreement.
The likelihood of a false positive should be the same, whether the
claim is a quick-look claim or a full-blown rule of reason claim.  This is
because questions involved in both quick-look and full-blown rule of rea-
son claims relate to the economic effects of the agreement and do not
implicate burdensome discovery.  One exception exists: quick-look
claims deal with inherently suspect restraints.  It is possible that the
agreements underlying a quick look analysis took place in secret.  The
asymmetric discovery burden on the agreement element would apply to
such a claim just as it would with a per se claim.151
B. Monopolization
Section Two of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization.152  The
monopolization offense has two elements—power and conduct.153  Un-
like a § 1 claim, circumstances rarely arise in a § 2 claim in which one of
the two elements is, for practical purposes, uncontested.154  Calculating
the expected cost of false positive error on a § 2 claim therefore requires
considering both the cost of false positive errors (determined above to be
high throughout the body of antitrust law) and the likelihood that each
element produces a false positive.
151 See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. R
152 Only a few cases discuss Twombly in the context of § 2. See, e.g., Port Dock & Stone
Corp. v. Oldcastle Northeast, Inc., 507 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2007) (dismissing monopolization
claims based on unilateral refusals to deal with competitors and citing Twombly for the stan-
dard on a motion to dismiss); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109,
1123 (2009) (referencing the necessity that the complaint in that § 2 case meet the Twombly
standard on remand).
153 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–571 (1966) (“The offense of
monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.”); see also Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Cur-
tis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004); Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns,
Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109, 1118 (2009).
154 For example, the Microsoft Corporation, with as much as 95% market share, nonethe-
less contested the market power element in a § 2 suit brought by the United States in 1998.
See WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE 96–114 (2007).  Microsoft
was able to raise a difficult legal question on the issues of market definition and entry barriers,
two issues inextricable from the larger market power question. See id. Likewise, the conduct
element of a § 2 claim will nearly always be contested.
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1. Market Power
The market power element of a § 2 claim requires that the defendant
possess substantial power over price.155  Such power is commonly in-
ferred from the defendant’s possession of a high share of an appropri-
ately defined market.156  Therefore, market definition plays a crucial role
in monopolization cases.
A market is determined by asking what alternatives a purchaser has
to satisfy his or her demand if an alleged monopolist raises its price.  The
most obvious alternative is to purchase exactly the same product from
another seller at exactly the same location.  Such alternative sellers of the
same product in the same geographic location are obviously included in
the market.  More difficult line-drawing questions arise with respect to
other possible alternative suppliers.  Should sellers of somewhat different
products, at the same location as the defendant, be included in the mar-
ket?  The answer is reached through an economic calculus, called the
“cross-elasticity of demand.”  If the customer views those other products
as good substitutes for the product produced by the alleged monopolist,
there is high cross-elasticity.  The substitutable products should be in-
cluded in the market because their presence reduces the alleged monopo-
list’s power to control price.157  Similarly, if producers of a different
product at the same location could easily begin making the product pro-
duced by the alleged monopolist, those other potential producers restrain
the alleged monopolist’s ability to raise prices.  Those potential alterna-
tive producers should also be included in the market.  This economic
calculus of likely entry is called the “cross-elasticity of supply.”158  The
process of defining a set of products that are good substitutes from either
a demand or supply perspective is referred to as “product market
definition.”
155 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
156 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[M]onopoly
power may be inferred from a firm’s possession of a dominant share of a relevant market that
is protected by entry barriers.”); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,
424 (2d Cir. 1945) (“The percentage we have already mentioned—over ninety—results only if
we both include all ‘Alcoa’s’ production and exclude ‘secondary’.  That percentage is enough
to constitute a monopoly . . . .”).
157 E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 400; United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d
229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003) (relying on expert testimony about consumer preferences in determin-
ing the relevant market).
158 The two forms of cross-elasticity require wholly separate economic analyses.  Cross-
elasticity of supply does not depend on cross elasticity of demand.  For example, from a pur-
chaser’s viewpoint, auto hubcaps and fenders are poor substitutes for each other.  However, if
a supplier can easily switch from making hubcaps to fenders, hubcaps and fenders are in the
same market.  Such markets can be defined based on a process of production rather than on the
basis of the end-product produced.  For example, hubcaps and fenders may both be produced
by firms in the light metal stamping market.
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In addition to defining the product market, a “geographic market”
must be defined.  This is because producers at other locations may re-
strain the alleged monopolist’s power over price.159  In response to a
high local price, customers may go to other geographic areas to purchase
the product.  Those remote producers will therefore have a price-con-
straining effect on the defendant.  Alternatively, producers from distant
areas may move to the defendant’s location.160  They are thus—like the
producers of different products who can overhaul production to make the
identical product as the defendant—potential competitors.161
The task of defining the relevant market, without which market
power cannot be proved, is notoriously bound up in factual complexity,
including complicated and expensive expert testimony.162  Expert opin-
ion may even require statistical support in order for a court to admit it.163
Like the reasonableness element of a § 1 claim, the market power ele-
ment of a § 2 claim may threaten a potential defendant with an expensive
investment in expert opinion.  But that is a red herring: like the reasona-
bleness element of the § 1 claim, the expense of discovery on the market
power element is borne uniformly between the parties.  Discovery is not
directed uniquely at the defendant in a way that incentivizes the plaintiff
to engage in burdensome discovery requests to coerce settlement.
Also, the factual development required for proof of market power
often involves facts found in the public domain or maintained by third
parties.  For example, demonstrating cross-elasticity of supply requires
interviewing or deposing third-party competitors or experts in the dy-
159 This applies to producers of identical products, producers of highly substitutable prod-
ucts, and potential producers of identical or highly substitutable products.
160 The customer’s ability to purchase at a distance and the sellers’ ability to sell in a new
area do not depend on each other.  Customers may find it difficult to purchase an ice cream
cone from a seller located far away.  However, sellers of ice cream cones may find it relatively
easy to open a store in a new location.
161 See generally Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the Potential Competition
Doctrine, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 1035 (analyzing the role of “spectator firms” in affecting com-
petition in a defined market, whether through their eventual entry or through the continual
threat of entry).
162 See KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 230–31 (2003) (“It should come as no surprise that parties spend vast sums of
money in litigation in efforts to get the Court to accept their definition of the relevant mar-
ket.”).  Professor Hylton notes two other means of measuring market power: profit margins
and constraints on pricing.  The first is “unsatisfying” because the appropriate measure of
profits, economic profit (which is profit net of opportunity cost) “is difficult to measure, and
courts typically make feeble efforts at best.” Id. at 231.  The second alternative approach
Hylton describes is little different from measuring market share.  Constraints on pricing are
precisely the demand and supply cross-elasticities we describe above.  And “the key point is
that the analysis of pricing constraints is a fact-sensitive, tedious process.” Id. at 234.
163 See William H. Page & John Lopatka, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise
in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 660–63 (2005) (citing district court opinions and
one opinion by Judge Easterbrook for the Seventh Circuit, excluding testimony for failure to
provide statistical analysis support).
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namics of a particular market.  Demonstrating cross-elasticity of demand
requires interviewing or deposing customers and experts.  Market share
data is sometimes publicly available.  None of that discovery is dispro-
portionately burdensome for the defendant.  The likelihood of a false
positive occurring on the market power element of a § 2 claim is very
low.
2. Conduct
A plaintiff’s obligation to plead and prove conduct reflects the well-
established rule that merely acquiring, or possessing, monopoly power is
not illegal.164  In addition, the defendant must do something to acquire or
maintain the monopoly that the law condemns.165  The conduct element
of the monopolization offense presents some of the most difficult
problems raised by antitrust law.166  Antitrust law aims to prohibit the
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power by inappropriate means.
However, it also wants to encourage vigorous, even cutthroat, competi-
tion by all firms including those with monopoly power or with an ability
to acquire it.  Establishing clear rules to draw the distinction between
illegal conduct and vigorous competition—the height of desirable con-
duct—is difficult.  Murky rules addressing that distinction can both erro-
neously allow inappropriate conduct and erroneously condemn or deter
competitive conduct.
The difficulty of the problem is exacerbated by the fact that both
illegal monopolizing conduct and legal competitive conduct can injure
other firms so much that the injured firms leave the market.  In recent
decades, the Supreme Court has focused its attention on three areas of
the conduct element: predatory pricing, unilateral refusals to deal with
competitors, and monopoly leveraging.  We apply the Twombly/Iqbal
pleading framework to the conduct element of § 2 by also focusing on
those three areas of conduct.
164 See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 (2009);
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).  This is
because monopoly power can be achieved through superior efficiency, reflected in charging
lower prices to customers and providing a superior product or service.  Antitrust law does not
condemn succeeding by being a more efficient competitor.  But see United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
165 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
166 In 2006 and 2007 the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission held a year-long series of hearings to inquire into the conduct element of the monopo-
lization offense.  In September 2008 the Department of Justice issued a report stating its view
regarding the conduct element.  Despite its co-sponsorship of the hearings, the Federal Trade
Commission declined to join in the report.  In May of 2009, following a change in administra-
tions, the Department of Justice expressly withdrew the report stating its disagreement with the
2008 report’s conclusions.  This series of events reflects the division of opinion regarding the
conduct element.
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a. Predatory Pricing
A monopolist reaps the benefits of a monopoly position by pricing
high and cutting output.167  High prices injure purchasers but they do not
exclude rival firms.  Indeed, it is a tenet of neoclassical economic theory
that high pricing by a monopolist encourages entry and expansion by
rival firms.168  This entry and expansion, whether it actually occurs or is
threatened, can reduce or eliminate the power of the monopolist.
Low pricing by a monopolist, on the other hand, can exclude ri-
vals.169  However, courts are hesitant to condemn low prices, which ben-
efit customers and move prices closer to those that would prevail in a
competitive market, a price-point that represents the antitrust ideal.170
The Supreme Court addressed that conundrum in Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.171 by creating a two-part test to
determine whether pricing by a monopolist represents illegal conduct
meeting the second element of § 2.  Pricing is predatory, and therefore
impermissible, if (1) it is below “an appropriate measure of” the monop-
olist’s cost of production, and (2) the monopolist has a dangerous
probability of recouping the losses it incurs by raising its prices later.172
167 The phrase “high price” actually refers to “quality-adjusted price,” such that the high
price can be achieved through decreasing the quality of the product or service offered.
168 Either approach to reaping monopoly rents—increasing prices or decreasing quality—
will encourage entry by competitors, who are attracted by the spread between the costs of
production and the revenue to be gained from the sale of the product or service.
169 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 208 (2d ed. 2002) (noting the possibility of
successful predatory pricing as an exclusionary strategy). See generally Note: When is Preda-
tory Pricing Rational?, in SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 141 , at 767–71.  We here likewise R
refer to quality-adjusted price.
170 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231 (1st Cir. 1983) (“[O]ne
must ask why the Sherman Act ever forbids price cutting. After all, lower prices help consum-
ers. The competitive marketplace that the antitrust laws encourage and protect is characterized
by firms willing and able to cut prices in order to take customers from their rivals. And, in an
economy with a significant number of concentrated industries, price cutting limits the ability
of large firms to exercise their ‘market power’; at a minimum it likely moves ‘concentrated
market’ prices in the ‘right’ direction-towards the level they would reach under competitive
conditions.  Thus, a legal precedent or rule of law that prevents a firm from unilaterally cutting
its prices risks interference with one of the Sherman Act’s most basic objectives: the low-price
levels that one would find in well-functioning, competitive markets.” (citations to scholarly
authorities omitted)); see also Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 931 (1st Cir.
1984) (“[C]ourts . . . should be cautious—reluctant to condemn too speedily—an arrangement
that, on its face, appears to bring low-price benefits to the consumer.”).
171 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
172 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–26
(1993) (applying the test in the context of the price discrimination prohibition contained in
Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) and stating that the same test applies to actions
under Sherman Act § 2.).  The Court has never had occasion to decide what measure of cost is
“appropriate.” See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223 n.1 (parties agreed that average variable
cost was the appropriate measure of cost, and Court “decline[d] to resolve” the question).
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The recoupment element of a predatory pricing claim ensures consumers
suffer a net detriment from the monopolist’s conduct.173
Courts and commentators have spilled much ink over the high cost
of false positive error on predatory pricing claims.  By pricing low and
increasing output, the alleged predator serves consumers’ interests per-
fectly.174  Only if the defendant is able to (1) succeed in eliminating its
rival through the price war and (2) maintain its monopoly position for
long enough to recoup the losses incurred by predatory pricing do con-
sumers sustain net harm from the defendant’s conduct.  The Supreme
Court has taken the position that successful predation is highly unlikely,
which means consumers receive a net benefit from the unsuccessful ef-
fort.175  Litigation that deters unsuccessful predation thus harms consum-
ers.  Also, nonpredatory competitive conduct—such as cutting prices to
compete, to sell off distressed merchandise, or to establish a toe-hold in a
new marketplace—presents no chance of consumer harm because the
nonpredatory conduct does not threaten to result in recoupment of the
defendant’s investment and consequent net consumer harm.
To an antitrust plaintiff or court, it may be difficult to distinguish
innocent price-cutting conduct from predatory conduct.  Even nonpreda-
tory, consumer-friendly pricing strategies may thus threaten the possibil-
ity of sanction.  Concern for false positive error motivate the substantive
law regarding predatory pricing contained in the Brooke Group test.
However, the focus of this Article is false positive error flowing from
pleading standards.
The likelihood of false positive error on the conduct element of
predatory pricing claims caused by the prospect of burdensome discov-
ery turns, as elsewhere, on the expected cost of litigation for the defen-
dant after the pleading stage.  We must then ask what the discovery
burden is and whether it is likely to fall disproportionately on the defen-
dant.  The answer is a mixed bag.  The first element of the impermissible
predatory pricing conduct inquiry, which asks whether the prices charged
are below an appropriate measure of the defendant’s costs, requires com-
paring the prices charged to some calculus of the defendant’s costs.  Dis-
covering the prices charged is not difficult—that information should be
available either in the public domain, through discovery of the defen-
dant’s customers, or both.  The defendant might, for example, publish
173 The Supreme Court has also applied the Brooke Group test to alleged predatory buy-
ing schemes, in which a firm acquires power as a buyer by bidding-up the prices to drive other
purchasers from the market.  Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549
U.S. 312, 319–20 (2007); Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224.
174 Because the predator necessarily has market power, its low-pricing forces all competi-
tors to price low as well.  Consumers thus benefit from the low prices whether or not they
actually purchase from the defendant.
175 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226–27.
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price lists, and evidence of undisclosed discounting will be available
through interviews or depositions of customers.176  That discovery does
not disproportionately impact the defendant.  The same is true of the re-
coupment element of the claim.  The defendant’s ability to recoup losses
incurred in predation, by pricing at monopoly levels after the victim is
driven from the market, is a function of the sustainability of the defen-
dant’s resulting monopoly power.  Questions of cross-elasticity of supply
and demand, which are so readily addressed with publicly-available in-
formation on the monopoly power question, are just as readily answered
on the recoupment element.177
The inquiry into the defendant’s cost structure does, however, re-
quire onerous and asymmetric discovery of the defendant.  Some ele-
ments of the defendant’s cost structure, such as costs of inputs (including
products used in manufacturing or services, such as shipping) and taxes
will be readily available to the plaintiff, who is usually the defendant’s
competitor.  Other elements, including labor costs, costs of proprietary
technology, and costs of capital, may be known only by the defendant.
There are also accounting problems inherent in allocating joint costs in-
curred by a defendant that operates in many marketplaces to the particu-
lar product or service that is the subject of the predatory pricing claim.
Discovery is therefore not limited to the production process of a single
product, but may require an analysis of the defendant’s company-wide
costs.
The foregoing paragraph demonstrates that discovery of the defen-
dant’s cost structure, which under Brooke Group is essential to a deter-
mination of whether the price charged is above or below an “appropriate
measure” of the defendant’s costs, places a tremendous burden on the
defendant.  That burden is borne uniquely by the defendant, thus impli-
cating the moral hazard problem by encouraging burdensome discovery
requests in the absence of a credible threat of a tit-for-tat response.
Another attribute of discovery on the price element of a predatory
pricing claim raises unique concerns.  The information necessary for ana-
lyzing the defendant’s price structure is extraordinarily sensitive.  Al-
though protective orders are available in litigation to limit such
176 Some markets are characterized by greater public availability of pricing information
than others. See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 U.S. 1109 (10th Cir. 2003) (govern-
ment predatory-conduct suit against American Airlines where prices are published through the
Airline Tariff Publishing system).
177 As elsewhere, we ignore the expense of expert testimony and discovery, which is
substantial.  Because it is not asymmetric in nature, plaintiffs already are incentivized to mini-
mize the burden on the defendant by not going forward with spurious claims.
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information’s exposure,178 defendants understandably will be loath to
produce that information.
The burden of discovery on the conduct element of a predatory pric-
ing claim renders false positive error highly likely to occur.  If a claim
makes it past the motion to dismiss stage, defendants are heavily incen-
tivized to settle even nonmeritorious claims, paying money although they
are innocent of the conduct alleged.  Moreover, those defendants, and
others similarly situated, are disincentivized from engaging in vigorous
price competition that might later be argued to be predatory in nature,
though beneficial to consumers. Iqbal and Twombly counsel for a careful
examination of complaints alleging predatory pricing.
b. Unilateral Refusals to Deal
The question whether a refusal to deal by a monopolist violates § 2
arises in several forms.  A monopolist may, for example, refuse to assist
a rival.  In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,179 the
Supreme Court faced a claim by a monopolist’s rival that a monopolist
violated Sherman Act § 2 by refusing to continue a cooperative selling
arrangement.  Defendant, Aspen Skiing Company, owned three of four
ski hills in Aspen, Colorado.  Plaintiff, Highlands, owned the fourth hill.
Aspen Skiing Company and Highlands had cooperated for years in sell-
ing a joint six-day, four-mountain ticket and sharing the revenues gener-
ated by the ticket.  Aspen Skiing Company terminated the relationship by
offering Highlands a revenue split that was unacceptable to Highlands.180
Aspen Skiing Company also refused to sell its own daily lift tickets to
Highlands, preventing Highlands from creating its own bundled ticket for
sale to consumers.181
The Court held that Aspen Skiing Company violated § 2 by engag-
ing in such unilateral refusals.  The Court reasoned that the refusals in-
jured Highlands, injured consumers, and were not motivated by any
legitimate business justifications.182  It concluded that Aspen Skiing
Company was foregoing revenues in order to injure Highlands.  The
Court reached that conclusion based on the fact that Aspen Skiing Com-
pany had previously been willing to deal with Highlands and ceased do-
ing so for no apparent reason.183  Its unilateral refusal to deal was
therefore illegal.184
178 Such orders may, for example, limit exposure of the sensitive information to plaintiff’s
counsel and testifying expert.
179 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
180 Id. at 592.
181 Id. at 593.
182 Id. at 605–11.
183 See id. at 608–09.
184 See id. at 610–11.
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A refusal to deal can also take the form of declining to allow access
to monopoly infrastructure.  In Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Of-
fices of Curtis V. Trinko,185 the Supreme Court addressed another refusal
by a monopolist to deal with a rival.  In Trinko, the defendant telephone
company was required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996186 to
share access to aspects of its local telephone network with its rivals.  The
plaintiff was a purchaser of telephone services who alleged that the de-
fendant had failed to meet its obligations.  The plaintiff alleged that the
refusal to share access impeded competition by other telephone compa-
nies, much as Aspen Skiing Company’s refusal to include Highlands in
its bundled ticket deal impeded competition by Highlands.  The Trinko
Court distinguished Aspen on the ground that the Aspen Skiing Company
had refused to sell its tickets to Highland, even though Highlands was
willing to pay full retail price.  By contrast, the network access that de-
fendant Verizon refused to sell to rivals was not voluntarily for sale in
any market at any price.  The conclusion, which was warranted in Aspen,
that the defendant was foregoing revenues, was unwarranted in
Trinko.187
Refusals to deal may also be directly aimed at customers or suppli-
ers and have an indirect impact on rivals.  In Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States,188 a newspaper refused to sell advertising to local
merchants who also advertised on a nearby radio station.189  The govern-
ment argued that this conduct was part of a plan to attempt to monopo-
lize in violation of § 2.  The Court upheld an injunction prohibiting the
publisher from refusing to accept such advertising.190  The Court ac-
knowledged that, in general, sellers may decide with which customers
they choose to deal.  However, it found that the right to freely select
one’s customers was not absolute, as “[t]he right claimed by the pub-
lisher is neither absolute nor exempt from regulation.  Its exercise as a
purposeful means of monopolizing interstate commerce is prohibited by
the Sherman Act.”191
The conduct element in a unilateral refusal to deal with a rival can
thus be understood, after Aspen and Trinko, to require two steps.  The
185 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
186 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
187 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (“Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability.
The Court there found significance in the defendant’s decision to cease participation in a coop-
erative venture. . . . The refusal to deal alleged in the present case does not fit within the
limited exception recognized in Aspen Skiing.  The complaint does not allege that Verizon
voluntarily engaged in a course of dealing with its rivals or would ever have done so absent
statutory compulsion.” (citations omitted)).
188 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
189 Id. at 148.
190 See id. at 152–53, 156.
191 Id. at 155.
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defendant must refuse to deal with its rival, and must do so against its
own economic self-interest.192  In an indirect refusal to deal situation like
Lorain Journal, the two steps are similar.  The defendant must refuse to
deal with its customer and must do so with the intent of harming its rival.
Discovery on one step of the conduct element, whether under an
Aspen/Trinko theory or a Lorain Journal theory, is simple.  The most
likely plaintiff is the harmed rival, who is well aware of the facts relevant
to the defendant’s refusal to deal.  If the refusal is indirect, the harmed
rival will have access to information about the defendant’s refusal from
the customer, whether through informal communications outside the ju-
dicial process or in discovery—through interviews or deposition.  No
discovery burden is imposed on the defendant, so no likelihood of false
positive error exists.
The second step of the conduct element of a unilateral refusal to
deal claim presents a high likelihood of false positive error.  Under an
Aspen/Trinko direct refusal to deal theory, evidence proving that the re-
fusal to deal is contrary to the defendant’s economic self-interest is
uniquely in the defendant’s control.  The burden of discovery is borne
exclusively by the defendant, with the attendant concerns for moral haz-
ard.  The evidence may also be highly, competitively sensitive, bearing,
for example, on the defendant’s forward-looking business strategies.  For
example, one might well imagine the kind of business case-analysis that
could accompany a corporate decision to discontinue the historic busi-
ness practice of selling a multi-mountain lift ticket.  Aspen Skiing Com-
pany might have been interested only in eliminating a rival.  It might also
have envisioned undertaking an expansion or a new marketing scheme
that would make the multi-mountain ticket inconvenient or unnecessary.
It is also possible that the pertinent evidence on the second part of
the conduct element is readily available to the plaintiff, with no threat of
discovery burden being imposed on the defendant.  One reading of Aspen
would permit a claim to be pleaded and proved only on the basis of an
unexplained change in the defendant’s competitive strategy.  It would be
sufficient to prove the defendant had previously found it advantageous to
deal with the victim-firm and inexplicably ceased doing so.  Such cir-
cumstantial proof of the defendant’s acting against its own economic in-
terest is similar to circumstantial proof of agreement.  The evidence of
observed marketplace conduct would be as easily available to the plain-
192 Unlike predatory pricing, which is beneficial to consumers in the absence of sustained
monopoly pricing producing net consumer harm, there is no initial benefit to consumers
through a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to deal.  Therefore, there is no need for a showing of
likely or actual recoupment.
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tiff as it would be to the defendant.193  Moreover, because such evidence
is public or quasi-public in nature, its disclosure does not implicate the
competitive concerns that private information about a defendant’s strate-
gic decisions implicates.
In the case of a Lorain Journal-type indirect refusal to deal theory,
the second step in the conduct analysis is the defendant’s intent to harm
its rival.  Proof of the defendant’s intent often requires access to evidence
that is exclusively in the hands of the defendant.  Examples include dep-
osition testimony of defendant’s executives or documents reflecting the
reasons for business decisions.  Discovery to find such evidence could be
massively burdensome.  Where the defendant is a large corporation, de-
termining which of the myriad agents authorized to act on the defen-
dant’s behalf held the individual intent to harm the rival might require
interviews with, and combing through documents in the possession of,
hundreds of employees.194  Yet, as with direct refusals to deal, it is also
possible to envision evidence of intent to harm a rival being readily
available to the plaintiff, and thus, the discovery burden on the defendant
being minimal.  The information might be quasi-public in nature, if, for
example, the defendant announced to its would-be customer that it
sought to prevent the success of a nascent competitor.
As with the per se § 1 claim, the likelihood of false positive error
turns on whether the conduct in a unilateral refusal to deal claim is to be
proved circumstantially or directly.  Direct proof implicates burden con-
cerns in a way that circumstantial proof does not.  Thus, an allegation of
a statement by the defendant (including an agent authorized to act on its
behalf) has a higher expected cost of false positive error, and the allega-
tions must be commensurately more specific.  An allegation of a lack of
a business justification for observed conduct, unsupported by direct evi-
dence, has a lower expected cost, because it relies primarily on expert
testimony and publicly available facts.  Thus, less specific allegations
would be sufficient.
c. Monopoly Leveraging
Refusals to deal and other strategies may be used by monopolists to
affect more than one market.  In some situations monopolists are alleged
to have leveraged their power in one market in order to gain power in
another market.  In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,
193 We do not address here whether, as a matter of substantive law, such purely circum-
stantial evidence would be sufficient to give rise to liability.
194 This replicates almost precisely the burden concern raised in Twombly.  Arguably, the
burden of this discovery on a § 2 claim is less because the chance of criminal prosecution in
the modern era is vanishingly small.  It is thus less likely that the internal corporate decision-
making process would be difficult to re-create.
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Inc.,195 Kodak was alleged to possess a monopoly over repair parts for
micrographic machines it manufactured.  It was also alleged to have used
that power to gain power in repair service for those machines.  Kodak
refused to sell parts to independent service organizations (ISOs), its ri-
vals in the service market, or to customers who used ISOs for service.196
Kodak also entered into agreements with parts manufacturers, who were
Kodak’s suppliers, that prohibited those manufacturers from selling parts
to ISOs.197  The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had presented suf-
ficient evidence to withstand Kodak’s motion for summary judgment.198
The Court viewed the question regarding the conduct element as whether
the exclusionary effects of Kodak’s policies were justified by legitimate
competitive reasons.  The Court stated:
The second element of a § 2 claim is the use of monop-
oly power ‘to foreclose competition, to gain a competi-
tive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.’  If Kodak
adopted its parts and service policies as part of a scheme
of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly
power, it will have violated § 2. . . . Liability turns, then,
on whether ‘valid business reasons’ can explain Kodak’s
actions.199
The Court determined that sufficient issues of material fact existed
regarding Kodak’s asserted justifications to deny summary judgment.200
The legitimacy of justifications for conduct that adversely impacts
rivals was examined further in a significant case that did not reach the
Supreme Court.  In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,201 Microsoft was
alleged to have maintained its monopoly in operating systems for per-
sonal computers by impeding the development of Netscape Navigator
and Java—both forms of “middleware”—that were thought to pose a
threat to Microsoft’s Windows operating system.  The fear was that de-
velopers of computer applications programs might ultimately write appli-
cations for middleware rather than for Windows.202  In assessing whether
Microsoft had violated the conduct element of § 2, the court viewed its
task as distinguishing actions that are net anticompetitive from those that
195 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
196 Id. at 458.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 485–86.
199 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482–83 (1992)
(citing Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71; Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600–05 (1985); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945)).
200 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483–86.
201 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
202 Id. at 53.
\\server05\productn\C\CJP\20-1\CJP101.txt unknown Seq: 50  9-NOV-10 11:45
50 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:1
are net pro-competitive.203  In undertaking that task, the court applied a
methodology similar to the rule of reason applied in § 1 cases.204  The
court imposed on the plaintiff the burden of demonstrating that the chal-
lenged conduct harmed the process of competition rather than merely
harming competitors.205  The court then shifted the burden to the defen-
dant to come forward with a pro-competitive justification.206  It then
shifted the burden of rebutting the proffered justification or demonstrat-
ing that the anticompetitive harm outweighed the pro-competitive justifi-
cation back to the plaintiff.207  The court acknowledged that it borrowed
that methodology from § 1 rule of reason cases.208  In evaluating whether
the government had met its initial burden of demonstrating that the chal-
lenged conduct damaged the competitive process, the court focused on
whether the conduct insulated the defendant’s product from competition
on the merits.209
In its most recent § 2 case, the Supreme Court addressed predatory
pricing, refusals to deal, and the effects of conduct on more than one
market.  In Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications,
Inc.,210 the defendant, Pacific Bell Telephone, provided high speed in-
ternet access (“DSL service”) to retail customers.  Pursuant to regulatory
requirements, it also provided wholesale access to DSL service to other
retail providers of that service including the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs al-
leged that the defendant violated § 2 by charging a high wholesale price
to the plaintiffs while charging a low retail price to consumers.  The re-
sulting price squeeze allegedly injured competition.
The Court assumed that the defendant had no antitrust duty to deal
with the plaintiff.211  The Court held that because the defendant had no
duty to deal with the plaintiff at all, the terms upon which it did deal
203 Id. at 58 (“Whether any particular act of a monopolist is exclusionary, rather than
merely a form of vigorous competition, can be difficult to discern: the means of illicit exclu-
sion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad.  The challenge for an antitrust court
lies in stating a general rule for distinguishing between exclusionary acts, which reduce social
welfare, and competitive acts, which increase it.”).
204 See supra text accompanying notes 145–49. R
205 253 F.3d at 58–59.
206 Id. at 59 (“[I]f a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case under § 2 by
demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then the monopolist may proffer a “procompetitive justi-
fication” for its conduct.  See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483.  If the monopolist asserts a
procompetitive justification—a nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form of com-
petition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced con-
sumer appeal—then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut that claim.”).
207 Id. (“[I]f the monopolist’s procompetitive justification stands unrebutted, then the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procom-
petitive benefit.”).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 62, 65, 75, 77.
210 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009).
211 Id. at 1118 n.2.
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were not subject to challenge under § 2.212  As to the retail-price portion
of the challenged conduct, the Court held that the price would violate § 2
if it met the two-prong test for predatory pricing set forth in Brooke
Group.213  The Court went on to state that on remand the assessment of
any Brooke Group claim would be subject to the pleading standard estab-
lished in Twombly.214
Under the modern analyses demonstrated by Linkline, Microsoft,
and Kodak, monopoly leveraging claims, not unlike the predatory pricing
and unilateral refusals to deal, turn on the existence or lack of a valid
business justification for the observed conduct.  As discussed above with
regard to refusals to deal under Aspen, proof of a valid business justifica-
tion sometimes will be possible through expert analysis of public or
semi-public information, with little discovery burden imposed on either
party.  Such circumstantial proof presents a low likelihood of false posi-
tive error, because the proof of a business justification is derived prima-
rily from expert testimony based on public information about the market.
But where, as in Linkline, the business justification required is a
cost analysis (i.e., that the pricing scheme complained of meets the
Brooke Group “appropriate measure of cost” test) the discovery burden
is identical to that discussed in subsection a above.  The information nec-
essary to demonstrate that the defendant’s prices are below cost is
uniquely in the defendant’s hands, is consequently burdensome to pro-
duce, and is enormously, competitively sensitive.  The likelihood of false
positive error is, therefore, at its highest.215
IV. TESTING CASES
Increasing numbers of antitrust courts have been tasked with decid-
ing motions to dismiss since Twombly and Iqbal were decided.  This Part
considers representative cases in the light of the expected value of false-
positive-error framework we have derived from Twombly and Iqbal.
This Part proceeds in the order in which the particular antitrust claims are
discussed in Part III.
212 Id. at 1119 (“But a firm with no duty to deal in the wholesale market has no obligation
to deal under terms and conditions favorable to its competitors.  If AT&T had simply stopped
providing DSL transport service to the plaintiffs, it would not have run afoul of the Sherman
Act.  Under these circumstances, AT&T was not required to offer this service at the wholesale
prices the plaintiffs would have preferred.”).
213 Id. at 1120.
214 Id. at 1123.
215 See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text. R
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A. Sherman Act § 1
1. Agreement
Allegations on the agreement element have been well-tested post-
Twombly, although fewer cases have been decided post-Iqbal.  Because
the concern about burdens, which underlies the Twombly rule, is strong-
est where an agreement will be proved by direct evidence, we would
expect courts applying Twombly to hold complaints to a higher bar where
proof by direct evidence will be necessary.  Conversely, where there are
circumstantial allegations, including a sufficient “but-for” allegation
tending to exclude the possibility of innocent conduct and proof by cir-
cumstantial evidence is a possibility, the complaint should normally be
approved.
a. Circumstantial Allegations
In the years immediately following Twombly, few complaints con-
tained a sufficient but-for allegation.  A recent holding by the Second
Circuit in Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment is an exception.216
Starr dealt with a claim of horizontal agreement on price and non-price
terms in the sale of digital music online.  The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants charged the same wholesale price for their music and em-
ployed identical restrictive contract terms.217  The Second Circuit relied
on seven “non-conclusory factual allegations of parallel conduct” that it
held “plausibly [suggested] that the parallel conduct alleged was the re-
sult of an agreement among the defendants.”218  The first was the allega-
tion that the defendants agreed to enter into joint ventures to distribute
music.219  Second was the allegation that prices stayed high despite de-
creasing distribution costs.220  Third was the parallel maintenance of high
prices and restrictive contract terms, even when other distribution chan-
nels were employed.221  Fourth and fifth were the use of most-favored
nation clauses in licenses with distributors that had the effect of creating
price rigidity among the defendants.222  Sixth was the parallel refusal to
deal with one distributor, eMusic, who apparently acted as a maverick in
216 592 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2010).
217 Id. at 317–19.
218 Id. at 322–24.
219 See id. at 318.  Although the allegation that the defendants “agreed” is certainly con-
clusory, see id. at 319 & n.2, the agreement at issue in that allegation was the agreement to
form a joint venture, which was conceded, and not the alleged agreement to fix prices. Id.
220 See id. at 318.
221 See id. at 318–19.
222 See id. at 319.
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the distribution marketplace.223  Seventh was a parallel price increase
among all the defendants.224
The court then listed other factors that it believed were consistent
with conspiracy being a plausible interpretation of the observed facts.
Those included high-concentration contract terms that “one industry
commentator noted” were not competitive and a statement by one defen-
dant’s CEO stating that one of the joint ventures was meant to “stop the
continuing devaluation of music.”225
The Second Circuit’s treatment of the circumstantial allegations in
Starr suggest that the court believed the plaintiffs were prepared to pro-
ceed with proof of agreement without unduly burdensome, or at least not
asymmetrically burdensome, discovery proceedings.  It noted that the al-
legations of parallel conduct, with the plus-factor allegations, “taken to-
gether, place the parallel conduct ‘in a context that raises a suggestion of
a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as
well be independent action.’”226  The Second Circuit’s approach is con-
sistent with the framework advanced in this Article.227  Because the alle-
gations suggested the plaintiffs were prepared to go forward with proof
by circumstantial evidence, the likelihood of false positive error was
minimized, and a lighter review at the motion to dismiss stage was war-
ranted.  The Second Circuit specifically rejected the argument that it was
necessary to identify the specific time, place, or person related to each
conspiracy allegation.228
The complaint in In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Liti-
gation229 alleged a price-fixing and market allocation agreement.  The
court in that case had held prior to Twombly that “an agreement among
oligopolists to fix prices at a supracompetitive level makes perfect eco-
nomic sense” based on the alleged market conditions.230  Plaintiffs al-
223 See id.
224 See id. at 320 (noting requested leave to amend the complaint to add the parallel price
increase allegation).
225 Id. at 322–24.
226 Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
227 This is so although one of us has stated elsewhere that the Second Circuit over-read
the importance of the allegations.  Comparable to Twombly, the observed facts in Starr are
entirely—and perhaps primarily—consistent with interdependent conduct rather than conspir-
acy.  Jacqueline Bell, 2nd Circuit Rule Highlights Twombly Trouble, LAW360 (Feb. 3, 2010)
(quoting Max Huffman) (on file with author).
228 See Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 592 F.3d 314, 325 (2d Cir. 2010).
229 566 F. Supp. 2d 363 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
230 Pressure-Sensitive Labelstock, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 371 (quoting the court’s prior opin-
ion, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 493 & n.4).  The court may have been wrong in concluding from the
allegations that the plaintiffs were prepared to proceed with proof by circumstantial evidence.
The fact that it might be in the defendants’ economic best interests to collude—an assertion
that the Twombly plaintiffs also made—is not sufficient to support a price-fixing claim, and in
fact, is nearly tautological.  The allegation that that the defendants agreed not to compete for
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leged price leadership by one defendant, despite that defendant’s
“historical reticence to spearhead price increases.”231  That allegation in-
voked the one-plus factor the Twombly Court appeared to recognize as
sufficient—”complex and historically unprecedented changes in pricing
structure.”232  With the sufficient but-for allegation, the Pressure-Sensi-
tive Labelstock plaintiffs demonstrated their capacity to proceed to proof
by circumstantial evidence, mitigating the discovery burden on the de-
fendant and the attendant likelihood of false positive error.
Insufficient circumstantial allegations demonstrate a plaintiff’s reli-
ance on the discovery of direct evidence through burdensome discovery.
The Sixth Circuit, in In re Travel Agent Commission Antitrust Litiga-
tion,233 considered allegations of “a series of uniform base commission
cuts adopted by defendant [airlines] over a seven-year period.”  The
plaintiffs alleged that the decisions to match commission cuts initiated by
the price leaders in the market were due to an illegal agreement.234  The
plaintiffs further alleged that the uniform commission cuts “would not
have occurred without collusion because such action, if taken indepen-
dently, was contrary to the individual defendant’s economic self inter-
est.”235  The Travel Agent Commission plaintiffs did not show their
ability to prove their case through circumstantial evidence.  Instead, the
allegations demonstrate plaintiffs’ need to make proof by direct evidence
of agreement, as the observed interdependent conduct of the airlines was
insufficient to make a circumstantial case of conspiracy.  Evidence of
actual agreement would be necessary, raising the concern for burden-
some and asymmetrical discovery.  With the necessity for direct proof,
customers was backed by an industry structure allegation that there was substantial excess
industry capacity and that one defendant was idling excess capacity in refusing to compete. Id.
at 371.  On its face, this allegation should fare no better.  Any increase in price, whether
achieved through innocent, interdependent, and consciously parallel conduct or through illegal
conspiracy, would have the effect of idling capacity by comparison to the lower prices.  And
although plaintiffs alleged that it made no sense economically to idle excess capacity in the
absence of an agreement, basic economic theory teaches otherwise.  Increasing prices and
decreasing output is a common strategy for profit maximization.  The fact that prices were at
supracompetitive levels both shows the economic rationality of the output restrictions and is
itself explainable through innocent, interdependent, and consciously parallel conduct.  The
court in Pressure-Sensitive Labelstock also found relevant an allegation that one defendant had
agreed with a third party not to compete, that the other defendant “was aware of the agree-
ment,” and that the other defendant itself forbore from competition.  This “suggest[ed] its
participation in an overarching conspiracy.” Id. at 371 n.7.
231 Id. at 372.
232 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 n.4 (2007); see also In re Graphics
Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1092–95 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding
sufficient allegations of changed behavior with regard to product announcements (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 n.4)); cf. id. at 1096 (direct allegations not always possible and not
necessary (citing Oltz v. St. Peter’s Hospital, 861 F.2d 1440, 1450–51 (9th Cir. 1988))).
233 583 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2009).
234 Id. at 899.
235 Id. at 900.
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the Sixth Circuit required specific allegations of facts that would give
notice of plaintiffs’ plan for proving the agreement.  Simply alleging that
an agreement existed was conclusory and insufficient.236
In In re Elevators Antitrust Litigation,237 the plaintiffs relied exclu-
sively on circumstantial allegations.  The Second Circuit held that com-
petitors’ use of similar contractual language, product prices, and designs
was consistent with competitive business decisions as well as with con-
spiracy.238  The court held that those similarities did not provide “plausi-
ble grounds to infer an agreement.”239  Coupling them with
“enumerat[ing] basically every type of conspiratorial activity that one
could imagine . . . in entirely general terms without any specification of
any particular activities by any particular defendant” did not help plain-
tiffs’ claims.240
The complaint that Elevators held insufficient more robustly alleged
plus-factors, tending to increase the opportunities for the defendants to
collude, than did the Twombly complaint.  The Elevators plaintiffs may
have been better prepared than the plaintiffs in Twombly to go ahead with
proof of agreement by circumstantial evidence.  However, the Elevators
236 Id. at 904–05.
237 In re Elevators Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007).
238 The complaint in Elevators alleged the following conduct: (1) “a combination and
conspiracy” Second Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint Para. 41 In re Elevators
Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007) (Nos. 04-CV-01178(TPG)), 2005 WL 3736019, (2)
“a continuing agreement, understanding and concert of action among the defendants and co-
conspirators,” id. Para. 42, (3) “meetings and conversations in Europe and the United States to
discuss the prices . . . and to discuss the applicable customers or markets,” id. Para. 43(a), (4)
that the defendants “[a]greed, during those meetings and conversations, to charge prices at
certain levels and otherwise increase or maintain prices,” id. Para. 43(b), (5) that the defend-
ants “[a]greed in advance on bid prices and bid winners,” id. Para. 43(c), (6) that the defend-
ants “[a]llocated markets and customers . . . consistent with the agreements reached,” id. Para.
43(e), and (7) that the defendants “[a]greed and took collective actions to drive independent
. . . companies out of the marketplace,” id. Para. 43(g).
The complaint also alleged facts that increased the opportunity to successfully collude,
including: (1) “[t]he industry . . . is characterized by economic conditions that are consistent
with and conducive to the conspiracy,” id. Para. 45, (2) “[t]here are a relatively small number
of companies . . . and high barriers to entry,” id. Para. 45, (3) “[t]he industry . . . is highly
concentrated,” id. Para. 46, (4) “[t]he market . . . is an oligopoly,” id. Para. 47, (5) “[t]he
industry . . . is closely knit, with many of a Defendants’ management personnel having family
or close friends who are employed by another Defendant,” id. Para. 47, (6) “[c]ompany execu-
tives . . . often attend industry, trade association and social functions together,” id. Para. 47, (7)
“[e]ach Defendant belongs to a number of associations and trade groups,” id. Para. 48, and (8)
the existence of “standard industry practices,” id. Para. 49.
The complaint included an attempt at a but-for allegation.  “There is no objective or pro-
competitive justification for any of this conduct.” Id. Para. 58.
Finally, the complaint listed conclusory allegations of violations of Sections One and
Two, engaged in collectively by the defendants and, in the case of some § 2 claims, individu-
ally by certain defendants. Id. Para. 76–133.
239 Elevators, 502 F.3d at 50, 51 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556 (2007)).
240 Id. at 50 (quoting the district court opinion).
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complaint contained only a weak attempt at a “but for” allegation, alleg-
ing only that there was “no objective or pro-competitive justification” for
the observed conduct.241  No allegation in the Elevators complaint took
the essential step required of circumstantial allegations by Twombly of
tending to exclude the possibility of unilateral conduct.242  Just as in
Twombly, then, the Elevators plaintiffs’ failure to sufficiently plead cir-
cumstantial evidence implicated the necessity of proving their claim
through direct evidence, which raised the plausibility bar.
241 Second Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint Para. 58 In re Elevators Anti-
trust Litig., 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007) (Nos. 04-CV-01178(TPG)), 2005 WL 3736019.
242 Elevators thus should be read as interpreting Twombly to limit sufficient plus-factor
allegations to those that tend to exclude the possibility of unilateral conduct.  This interpreta-
tion of the plus factor framework was argued to the Supreme Court in Twombly, see Brief for
Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 25–26, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 2474080, and is the best explanation
for the Second Circuit’s holding in Elevators that even substantial plus-factor allegations were
insufficient to survive a Twombly motion.  The Ninth Circuit, reviewing an order of dismissal
in Kendall v. Visa USA, Inc., likewise rejected allegations of parallel conduct coupled with the
allegation that the defendants “‘knowingly, intentionally and actively participated in an indi-
vidual capacity in the alleged scheme’ to fix [prices].”  518 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citing Complaint ¶ 11); see also Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Corp., 546
F.3d 1288, 1297–98 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding conclusory allegations of conspiracy without
supporting factual allegations insufficient); Shames v. Hertz Corp., 2008 WL 4103985 (S.D.
Cal. Jul. 24, 2008) (dismissing price fixing complaint); Windage, LLC v. U.S. Golf Ass’n,
2008 WL 2622965 (D. Minn. Jul. 02, 2008) (conspiracy element of a group boycott claim); In
re Parcel Tanker Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 541 F. Supp. 2d 487 (D. Conn. 2008) (dis-
missing price fixing complaint); Southeast Missouri Hosp. v. C.R. Bard Inc., 2008 WL 199567
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 22, 2008) (dismissing conspiracy allegations for failure to allege anything be-
yond parallel conduct); Int’l Norcent Tech. v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., 2007 WL
4976364, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2007) (dismissing complaint alleging a standard-setting
agreement partly on the basis of a failure sufficiently to allege the defendants reached agree-
ment); Sheridan v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 2007 WL 2900556 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2007)
(dismissing complaint alleging tying and price-fixing agreements); Schafer v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596-97 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2007) (dismissing price fixing
allegations on the basis of failure to allege more than interdependent conduct).  Kendall was an
easy case, as the complaint contained nothing but a bare allegation of conspiracy, which
Twombly—consistent with the great weight of prior authority—had held insufficient. See DM
Research, Inc. v. College of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[T]erms like
‘conspiracy,’ or even ‘agreement,’ are border-line: they might well be sufficient in conjunction
with a more specific allegation—for example, identifying a written agreement or even a basis
for inferring a tacit agreement—but a court is not required to accept such terms as a sufficient
basis for a complaint. The case law on this point is ample.” (citations omitted)).  No facts
alleged constituted plus factors, and certainly no facts alleged in Kendall tended to exclude the
possibility of unilateral conduct.  The Kendall plaintiffs apparently hoped to rely on direct
proof of conspiracy, which implicates the more burdensome sort of discovery and favors a
searching review of complaints. See, e.g., Rik-Mik Enters. v. Equilon Enters., Inc., 532 F.3d
963, 975–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The nature of the conspiracy or agreement is not alleged.  The
type of agreements are not alleged.”).
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b. Direct Allegations
Starr and Pressure-Sensitive Labelstock are rare cases involving
complaints that survive on the basis of sufficient circumstantial allega-
tions.  Most complaints that survive rely on direct allegations of agree-
ment that are sufficiently specific to mitigate the concern for burden.243
Pressure-Sensitive Labelstock also contained direct allegations that
might meet the Twombly/Iqbal standard.  The plaintiffs in that case al-
leged “direct discussions about the need to collaborate on price increases
during the October 2000 conference” of the industry trade association.244
Such a specific allegation permits the trial court to carefully cabin the
discovery required to produce evidence relating to that allegation.  The
district court could limit discovery to those agents of defendants present
at the October 2000 conference and could limit it to topics related to that
conference.  Because of the specificity of the direct allegations, the bur-
den concern is minimized.
Allegations of a rebate ban imposed by a trade organization on its
members were sufficient direct allegations of a conspiracy in Hyland v.
Homeservices of America, Inc.245  The complaint “alleged admissions of
price-fixing by real estate brokers [and] an exchange of price information
and catalogues between the parties.”246  The plaintiffs in Hyland also
alleged the rebate ban, which had been the subject of a civil action by the
U.S. Department of Justice.247  Because the complaint alleged a conspir-
acy directly, rather than circumstantially, burdensome discovery was
threatened in Hyland.  However, the allegations were sufficiently de-
tailed to offer the court a path to cabining discovery.  The plaintiffs
might be permitted to inquire into the statements supposedly constituting
243 See In re Static Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 426522, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2008) (plaintiffs argued they had made direct allegations of agreement);
Schafer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d 587, 596 n.26 (E.D. La. 2007) (citing
Janet L. McDavid & Eric Stock, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 29 NAT’L L.J. 47 (2007)). See
generally William H. Page, Twombly and Communication, supra note 131, at 455–64 (citing R
authorities for the proposition that pleading agreement under § 1 requires pleading communi-
cation between the parties).
244 In re Pressure Sensitive Labelstock Antitrust Litigation, 566 F. Supp. 2d 363, 372
(M.D. Pa. 2008); see also In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 586 F.Supp.2d 1109,
1115–17 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (alleging, among other things, “specific instances of invitations to
agree and subsequent agreements,” “statements by [one defendant] boasting that it had suc-
ceeded in convincing its competitors to cut capacity,” and the “exchange [of] numerous types
of sensitive competitive information”); In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Anti-
trust Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901–04 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (detailing allegations of communi-
cations between defendants and concluding the facts were sufficient to meet Twombly’s
standard for circumstantial conspiracy allegations).
245 2007 WL 2407233 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 17, 2007).
246 Id. at *3.
247 Third Amended Class Action Complaint paras. 50–58 (No. 3:05-CV-612-R), Hyland
v. Homeservices of Am., 2007 WL 2407233 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 17, 2007), 2007 WL 2933237.
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admissions, the exchange of price information, and the rebate ban, but no
further.
Direct allegations of “swap” agreements between cable service
providers in different geographic locales were sufficient to state a § 1
claim in Behrend v. Comcast Corp.248  The agreements involved trading
customers in such a way that the defendants gained greater market power
in their respective locations.  The complaints included direct allegations
of agreements.249  The Behrend Court stated that “[t]he [complaints] pro-
vide factual descriptions of the parties, their roles as competitors in the
geographic markets, when the agreements were completed, and how the
terms thereof allegedly eliminated competitors in, and raised entry and
reentry barriers to, the [markets].”250  Although direct allegations raise
greater burden concerns, the allegations in Behrend were easily specific
enough to overcome the concern for burden associated with one-sided
discovery.
There were both direct and circumstantial allegations in City of
Moundridge v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,251 which involved allegations of
price fixing by natural gas refiners in a suit by plaintiff municipalities.
The court in that case considered circumstantial allegations of price fix-
ing: “the natural gas total resource base had not decreased, . . . the prices
had risen and never fallen below an agreed-upon price, . . . the defend-
ants had reported high profits, and . . . Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
should not have affected the market as the defendants claimed.”252  Pro-
viding “historical supply and consumption levels, market prices, profit
levels, and the use of industry reports,” was sufficient “to support an
248 532 F. Supp. 2d 735 (E.D. Pa. 2007).  The Behrend complaint alleged violations of
both Sections One and Two by Comcast Corporation and its affiliates.  Third Amended Class
Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act paras. 3, 6, 9 (No. 03-6604),
Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d 735 (E.D. Pa. 2007), 2006 WL 1760198.  The
theories of harm are reminiscent of those advanced in Twombly.  The § 1 theory is one of
market division—creating customer clusters to avoid competition within markets. Id. at para.
10.  The Section Two theory, also like Twombly, is that the defendant refused to allow access
to its facilities to would-be new entrant competitors. Id. at para. 11.  Unlike in Twombly,
however, in Behrend, the plaintiffs were able to allege several specific agreements that they
believed constituted market allocations. Id. at paras. 54–56.  The § 2 allegations, likewise,
included a litany of alleged mergers through which the defendants gained market share in the
alleged markets. Id. at paras. 51–53.  Both of the theories are suspect as a matter of substan-
tive law, but unlike Twombly, the Behrend complaint did not turn on conclusory legal
assertions.
249 Behrend, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 741.
250 Id.; see also Omnicare, Inc. v. Unitedhealth, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1038 (N.D.
Ill. 2007) (direct allegations of a merger agreement sufficient to allege an agreement to coordi-
nate decisions pre-merger). Omnicare is a surprising result.  The court held that there were
direct allegations of an agreement, although the terms of the agreement—to merge—were not
the basis for the antitrust claim, which was pre-merger coordination. Id.
251 250 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2008).
252 Id. (citing the Second Supplemental Complaint ¶¶ 36, 37).
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inference that the defendants engaged in not merely parallel conduct, but
rather agreed” to fix prices.253  There were also some direct allegations:
the complaint also identified “the years and locations where the agree-
ment was reached and the defendants who participated.”254
City of Moundridge is another case in which the circumstantial alle-
gations were insufficient to obviate the need to rely on proof by direct
evidence.255  The allegations that profits were high, that supply was re-
stricted despite ample resources, and that those phenomena could not be
explained by external forces such as hurricanes do not exclude the possi-
bility of oligopoly pricing through interdependent conduct.  Therefore,
they should not be sufficient “but for” allegations to permit plaintiffs to
proceed on proof by circumstantial evidence.  However, the complaint
provided sufficiently specific allegations with regard to the conduct from
which an agreement could be inferred to permit the plaintiffs to proceed
on a theory of proof by direct evidence.256
Courts are still feeling their way in applying the Twombly/Iqbal
standard to conspiracy allegations.  The primary difficulty appears to be
a lack of appreciation of the underlying rationale for the standard.  The
253 Id.
254 Id. (citing the Second Supplemental Complaint ¶¶ 15, 17–18).
255 See also Hackman v. Dickerson Realtors, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 938 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
Hackman held that allegations against one defendant that she knew of a group animus, which
later (in her absence) led to a conspiracy, and that she acted consistently with it, were suffi-
cient to permit discovery as to whether she was actually a member of the conspiracy.  Id. at
944.  The allegations against the defendant were that she took actions consistent with the
alleged group boycott, that she “knew of the vendetta against” plaintiff, and that she had
previously worked for the area realtor’s association. Id. (citing Amended Complaint ¶ 43).
The court acknowledged that the sufficiency of those allegations “is a closer call.” Id. at 944.
Allegations against other defendants in Hackman, which include the allegation that at a speci-
fied meeting, “the agency Defendants . . . agreed not to do business with” plaintiff, id. (citing
Amended Complaint ¶ 36), are sufficient under Twombly.  The amended Hackman complaint
did not include a direct allegation that the defendant communicated her involvement to the
other alleged co-conspirators.  The Hackman court may have over-read the allegations.  The
circumstantial allegations in Hackman with regard to the one defendant were neutral as to
whether she was a party to an agreement.  She could have known of the group animus against
the plaintiff without knowing of the alleged conspiracy.  Even if she knew of the agreement,
she might nonetheless have unilateral incentives to act in a manner consistent with it.  For
example, a maverick firm may decline to join a price fixing conspiracy but take advantage of
the price umbrella created by the minimum price fixing and unilaterally raise its own prices.
Cf. Cosmetic Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 53–54 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding,
at the summary judgment stage, that without evidence that conduct was contrary to a defen-
dant’s unilateral self interest, a conspiracy was not demonstrated by circumstantial evidence).
The allegations in Hackman also lack sufficient specificity to allow plaintiffs to prove agree-
ment by direct evidence.  The danger of burdensome, one-sided discovery existed in Hackman.
256 City of Moundridge, 250 F.R.D. at 5 & n.4 (circumstantial allegations plus specific
direct allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss (citing In re OSB Antitrust
Litig., 2007 WL 2253419, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007))); see also Fair Isaac Corp. v. Equifax
Inc., 2008 WL 623120, at *5–*6 (D. Minn. Mar. 4, 2008) (holding circumstantial allegations
of agreement were sufficient where the temporal period in which the alleged agreement was
hatched was minimized).
\\server05\productn\C\CJP\20-1\CJP101.txt unknown Seq: 60  9-NOV-10 11:45
60 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20:1
rationales advanced here explain the appropriate treatment of circumstan-
tial and direct allegations.  Where the allegations demonstrate a capacity
to proceed with circumstantial proof, as in Starr and Pressure-Sensitive
Labelstock, the expected cost of false positive error is relatively low, and
discovery should be permitted to proceed.  Where allegations demon-
strate a need to proceed with direct evidence, the expected cost of false
positive error is high.  Only where the allegations are sufficiently de-
tailed, so as to cabin the discovery requests, should the complaint sur-
vive—as in cases like Hyland and Behrend.  But, in cases like Travel
Agent Commissions and Elevators, insufficient circumstantial allegations
coupled with no, or insufficient, direct allegations necessitate dismissal.
2. Reasonableness
The Ninth Circuit applied Twombly to a rule of reason claim in Wil-
liam O. Gilley Enterprises v. Altantic Richfield Co.257  In Gilley, the
agreement element was alleged via claims of “exchange agreements”—
express contracts—between defendant oil producers.258  Given the nature
of the claims, the question involved the sufficiency of pleading the ef-
fects of those contracts.  The court stated that “[b]ecause each of the
exchange agreements arguably affects only a small amount of CARB
gas, [p]laintiffs pleaded the cumulative effect of a single Defendant’s
exchange agreements to show market power and anticompetitive ef-
fect.”259  The majority held that aggregation of the effects of many dis-
crete agreements is legally permissible.260
257 561 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 588 F.3d 659 (2009).  A
lower court in the Ninth Circuit has also done so, in that case reaching an erroneous conclu-
sion. See Int’l Norcent Tech. v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., 2007 WL 4976364 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 29, 2007).  In International Norcent Technology, the agreement alleged was a standard-
setting agreement relating to a video-disc technology. Id. at *8–*9.  Because such standard-
setting is subject to the rule of reason, litigation over the impact of the agreement produces low
and symmetrical discovery burdens. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.  Dismis-
sal should not be appropriate for failure sufficiently to allege the competitive harm from such
an agreement.  The court’s error in International Norcent Technology appears to be uncriti-
cally importing lessons from the process of pleading agreement into other elements of the
Section One claim. See id. at *8.
258 Id. at 1010. Gilley is an example of the reality, which we discussed above, that where
the alleged violation is something other than hard-core cartel conduct, it will usually be the
case that the behavior is not hidden.  It therefore does not present a pleading problem regard-
ing the agreement element. See also Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 592 F.3d 314,
326–28 (2d Cir. 2010) (concession that joint venture agreement existed precluded dismissal of
conspiracy claims); In re Hypodermic Products Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 1959224, at
*14–*15 (D.N.J. June 27, 2007) (holding direct allegations of agreement sufficient to state a
claim; allegations of anticompetitive effects could not be evaluated at the motion to dismiss
stage).
259 561 F.3d at 1010.
260 See id.
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Over defendants’ arguments that the exchange agreements were ef-
ficiency-enhancing, the court held the factual question of the anticompe-
titive effects of the aggregated contracts, balanced against the pro-
competitive efficiencies they offered, could not be resolved at the motion
to dismiss stage.261  Given the low and symmetrical burden of discovery
on the reasonableness element, the Gilley court correctly applied the
pleading standard defined by Iqbal and Twombly.
B. Sherman Act § 2
1. Predatory Pricing
While decided on the basis of antitrust injury, the Sixth Circuit’s en
banc decision in NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Company,262 can be instructively
analyzed as a § 2 decision.263  The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff
would lack standing if the conduct it complained of was not illegal under
§ 2.  It then proceeded to consider the plaintiff’s allegations in the light
of the substantive standard for § 2 liability.264
261 Id. at 1011. Contra Lady Deborah’s, Inc. v. VT Griffin Servs., Inc., 2007 WL
4468672, at *8 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 2007) (dismissing on the basis of the defendant’s failure to
allege injury to competition).  The Gilley dissent recognized that “Twombly involved an al-
leged conspiracy based on parallel conduct and this case is ostensibly not a conspiracy case.”
Gilley, 561 F.3d at 1019 (Callahan, J., dissenting).  But the dissent read the complaint as being
ambiguous as to what the agreements actually were, contending that rather than relying on
each defendant’s aggregated, bilateral exchange agreements, the plaintiffs were in reality hop-
ing to establish a conspiracy represented by a web of bilateral agreements among the defend-
ants.  Under that understanding, the plaintiffs’ allegations fell short of adequately identifying
the agreements. Id. at 1021.
262 507 F.3d 442 (2007) (en banc).
263 Nicsand applied the Twombly standard to the antitrust injury element of antitrust
standing, which requires that the plaintiff allege harm from the anticompetitive impacts of an
antitrust violation. Id. at 451 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–58
(2007)); see also CBC Companies v. Equifax, Inc., 561 F.3d 569, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2009)
(same); Int’l Norcent Tech. v. Konenklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., 2007 WL 4976364, at *15
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2007) (failure sufficiently to allege antitrust injury is an alternative basis
for dismissing the complaint).  Other courts have also applied Twombly to the antitrust stand-
ing requirement, the most prominent factor of which is the requirement of antitrust injury.  The
court in Hypodermic Products held that an allegation that “by unlawfully excluding and im-
pairing competition, [defendant]’s conduct has caused Plaintiffs and the other Class members
to pay more . . . than they otherwise would have paid” sufficiently alleged antitrust injury.
2007 WL 1959224, at *10 (quoting Amended Complaint ¶ 107); see also id. at *15.  Antitrust
injury requires a showing that the plaintiff was harmed by reason of a violation of the antitrust
laws. See Max Huffman, A Standing Framework for Private Extraterritorial Antitrust En-
forcement, 60 SMU L. REV. 103, 108 & n.29 (2007).  That showing therefore necessitates a
showing of an antitrust violation.  Some courts, like NicSand, have treated the antitrust injury
question as a preliminary analysis of the substantive antitrust claim. See Joseph P. Bauer, The
Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Stand-
ing, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437, 448–49 (2001) (noting in one case that a conclusion pertaining to
the lack of antitrust injury reflected “uncertainty about the merits of the claim”).
264 NicSand, 507 F.3d at 451.
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NicSand showcases the difficulties facing a § 2 plaintiff pleading a
claim after Twombly.  The NicSand plaintiffs alleged that 3M had made
cash payments, which were “nothing more than ‘price reductions offered
to the buyers’” to retailers in order to earn their business.265  The major-
ity held the plaintiffs had conceded in their briefing the prices charged
were not predatory.266  The dissent disagreed that such a concession had
been made.  It compared the size of the up-front payments by 3M with
the profits plaintiffs had earned in the market in a recent year.  That com-
parison indicated that plaintiff would suffer a loss in many transactions if
it made such a large up-front payment.267  The dissent argued that the
analysis created a sufficient inference that 3M was earning a loss in those
transactions—thus, pricing below-cost and implicating § 2268—that
plaintiff should be entitled to discovery.269  The burden of discovery on
the below-cost aspect of the predatory pricing claim makes it appropriate
under Iqbal and Twombly to subject the complaint to a searching inquiry,
in order to avert the false positive concern that ranks so high on those
claims.  But it seems likely the dissent has the better argument in Nic-
Sand.  It is not clear that a predatory pricing plaintiff can do better than
to posit its own costs as a plausible proxy for the defendant’s costs and to
compare that proxy to publicly available information about the defen-
dant’s prices.  The plaintiff did so, and the complaint should have sur-
vived the motion to dismiss.
2. Monopoly Leveraging
In one of the few explicit applications of Twombly to a § 2 claim,
the district court in In re Hypodermic Products Antitrust Litigation,270
applied the Twombly standard in denying a motion to dismiss a com-
plaint alleging violations of both §§ 1 and 2.271  The court required that
265 Id. at 452.
266 Id. Contra NicSand, 507 F.3d at 463 (the majority’s assertion that plaintiff conceded
this point is “misleading”).
267 NicSand, 507 F.3d at 462 (Martin, J., dissenting).
268 See infra notes 166–77 and accompanying text (describing standards for predatory R
pricing).
269 NicSand, 507 F.3d at 462–63 (Martin, J., dissenting).  Another of plaintiff’s claims
against 3M in NicSand—that 3M engaged in exclusive dealing with retailers through multi-
year agreements, foreclosing plaintiff from the market—does not present the same problem
under Twombly because no inference is necessary.  The plaintiff was able to allege the exis-
tence of an agreement, thus permitting the court to evaluate the alleged agreements on the
merits.  The Sixth Circuit concluded that the agreements were not anticompetitive. NicSand,
507 F.3d at 453–54.  The dissent did not argue, as it did with regard to predatory pricing, that
the court was required to indulge an inference with regard to a fact that was unknowable
without discovery.  The allegations were direct, but the conduct alleged was held not to be a
§ 2 violation.
270 In re Hypodermic Prods. Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 1959224 (D.N.J. June 29, 2007).
271 Hypodermic Products also applied the Twombly standard to the antecedent question of
whether the plaintiffs had antitrust standing.  2007 WL 1959224, at *6-*7.   The allegations of
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the complaint allege the two elements of a § 2 violation, “that [defen-
dant] possesses monopoly power” and “that [defendant] has maintained
such a monopoly by unlawful means.”272
The court held that the first element had been sufficiently alleged by
the claim that the “[d]efendant illegally acquired and maintained monop-
oly power over various hypodermic products and markets for those prod-
ucts,” together with allegations of how those markets were defined.273
Because the market-power element of § 2 creates relatively little danger
of false positive error,274 and the allegations provide sufficient specificity
to overcome what discovery burden concerns do exist, the conclusion
that the Hypodermic Products complaint sufficiently alleged market
power275 is correct.
In Hypodermic Products, the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded the con-
duct element of monopolization. The successful allegations included
claims that: (1)  “Defendant . . . has used . . . various anti-competitive
and illegal practices to achieve and maintain its dominant market posi-
tion” against “superior products . . . or cheaper products,” and (2) defen-
dant “impos[ed] market share purchase requirements,” (3) “bundl[ed] its
goods for exclusionary purposes,” (4) “conspir[ed] with [Group Purchas-
ing Organizations]” for the purpose of imposing exclusionary contracts,”
harm suffered from the antitrust violation, a requirement of standing under Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977), was sufficiently pleaded when plaintiff alleged
facts creating an inference of harm that was inextricably intertwined with harm in the relevant
product markets. Id. at *9.
272 2007 WL 1959224, at *10 (applying the elements of a monopolization claim under § 2
from United States v. Dentsply, 399 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2005): “(1) possession of monop-
oly power in the relevant product market and (2) ‘ . . . maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident’”).
273 Hypodermic Prods., 2007 WL 1959224, at *10, *12 (“The Court . . . has been given
no reason to believe that the relevant markets, as plead in the Complaint, are anything but
plausible.” (quoting Amended Complaint ¶ 3)). But see Little Rock Cardiology Clinic v. Bap-
tist Health, 573 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1139-50 (E.D. Ark. 2008) (applying Twombly to allegations
about the relevant market both for a § 1 and a § 2 rule of reason claim, holding that the
plaintiff had failed to plead the relevant market properly, even though the plaintiffs’ failings
were not due to a lack of information about the product market, which might have been allevi-
ated by further discovery.  Instead, the markets alleged simply were legally insufficient); see
also Rik-Mik Enters. v. Equilon Enters., Inc., 532 F.3d 963, 972–73 (9th Cir. 2008) (failure to
allege market power in the tying market for purposes of a § 1 claim); Lady Deborah’s, Inc. v.
VT Griffin Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 4468672, at *10 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 2007) (holding failure to
allege facts showing defendant’s power over price defeated a § 2 claim).
274 See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. R
275 The Hypodermic Prods. court found no need to discuss other allegations related to the
market definition element of the monopolization claim.  The plaintiffs had also alleged that
“there is no product that can reasonably be substituted for” four of the different products,
Amended Complaint paras. 29, 34, 39, 44 and 46, In re Hypodermic Products Antitrust Litig.,
2007 WL 1959224 (D.N.J. June 29, 2007) (05-CV-1602 (JLL/CCC)), 2006 WL 2430091, and
that the “defendant has . . . a market share in excess of 70%” With respect to three of the
different products. Id. paras. 31, 36, 41.
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and (5) “conspir[ed] with other manufacturers to ‘impose rebate penalties
on purchasers relating to a bundle of products.’”276  In addition to the
general allegations of anticompetitive conduct, the complaint included
specific allegations of vertical agreements between the defendant and
purchasers, which had the effect of preserving defendant’s high-market
share.277  Comparing those allegations to those the Supreme Court held
insufficient in Twombly, the Hypodermic Products court noted that the
conspiracy alleged in Twombly was based on inference from observed
innocent conduct, while the conduct alleged in Hypodermic Products
was “specific anti-competitive agreements.”278
The Hypodermic Products plaintiffs were able to allege the conduct
directly.279  The court noted “such allegations . . . [were] in sharp con-
trast with the allegations found to be insufficient in [Twombly].”280  The
Twombly complaint “sought to demonstrate anti-competitive agreements
based on parallel conduct through inference.  To the contrary, the instant
Complaint sets forth allegations of specific anti-competitive agree-
ments . . . .”281  The varieties of conduct meeting the second element of a
monopolization claim makes it difficult to generalize about applying the
Twombly/Iqbal framework to monopolization cases.  But, as with anti-
trust claims generally, when a monopolization claim requires proof by
reference to a defendant’s internal documents and information, the
threatened discovery burden will counsel for careful review of the com-
plaint’s allegations.  When proof may be made with public or semi-pub-
lic information (such as market analysis or customer testimony) the
reduced discovery burden counsels for permissive treatment of the
complaint.
C. Summary
Germs of the framework we outline can be found in case law de-
cided since Twombly and Iqbal.  Section One cases turning on the agree-
ment element are not surprisingly the best represented in the small
sample of antitrust cases that analyze the Supreme Court’s recent plead-
ing authorities in depth.  Within that category, the divide between the
Second Circuit’s opinion in Starr and the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in In re
Travel Agent Commissions exemplifies the important dichotomy between
proof by circumstantial evidence and proof by direct evidence.  A suffi-
276 Hypodermic Prods., 2007 WL 1959224, at *10 (quoting Amended Complaint ¶¶ 6, 7).
277 Id. at *13.
278 Id. at *14.
279 Cf. William O. Gilley Enterprises v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 561 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2009).
280 Hypodermic Products, 2007 WL 1959224, at *14.
281 Id.; see also In re Hypodermic Prods. Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 1959225, at *12
(D.N.J. June 29, 2007).
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ciently robust showing of circumstantial allegations should give a court
reviewing the complaint confidence that the plaintiff is prepared to pro-
ceed without unduly burdening the defendant during discovery, thus mit-
igating the likelihood (and the expected cost) of false positive error.
However, a skeletal showing of observed conduct, or a showing of con-
duct that produces an inference of unilateral activity, shows that proof by
direct evidence will be necessary.  The consequent burden on the defen-
dant during discovery counsels for dismissal.  The third category of
agreement cases, represented by Behrend v. Comcast Corp., are those in
which plaintiffs are able to plead specific direct allegations of agreement.
Such allegations demonstrate the likely merit of the plaintiffs’ claims and
impact the expected cost analysis by reducing the likely cost because
discovery will not be a fishing expedition.
The relatively low discovery burden on the reasonableness element
of a § 1 claim suggests courts should rarely dismiss when proof will turn
on that element.  The Gilley Court, in holding that discovery was neces-
sary to determine the effects of agreements (the existence of which was
not contested), is consistent with that approach.
We demonstrated in Part III that monopolization claims under § 2
are proved with facts showing monopoly power and facts showing con-
duct.  The former present little concern for false positive error due to
burdensome discovery because they are proved circumstantially. In re
Hypodermic Products had little trouble concluding that element was suf-
ficiently alleged.  The facts required to prove conduct, however, are more
varied (in part because of the variety of conduct meeting that element of
the monopolization claim).  Predatory pricing claims, for example, re-
quire a burdensome inquiry into the defendant’s cost structure.  The
Sixth Circuit in NicSand v. 3M concluded that the allegations in the com-
plaint were insufficient to allow discovery on that element.  Monopoly
leveraging presents a more context-specific problem.  Proof of the “no
business justification” showing from Aspen can be made directly or cir-
cumstantially.  As with the agreement element of a § 1 claim, direct
proof raises concerns for burdensome discovery into the defendant’s bus-
iness plans, while circumstantial proof involves a nonburdensome market
analysis. In re Hypodermic Products allowed discovery to proceed on a
theory that was to be proved directly because the complaint was suffi-
ciently specific to mitigate the burden on the defendant.
As we conclude below, that same analysis of the facts required to
prove a claim may be developed for any antitrust claim or any claim that
may be the subject of private federal litigation.
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CONCLUSION
In Twombly and Iqbal the Supreme Court was faced with the ques-
tion of when a plaintiff should be allowed to proceed with discovery.
Procedurally, that question arises when a court is asked to dismiss a
plaintiff’s complaint.  Granting a motion to dismiss creates the risk of
false negative error, because the complaint may assert a claim that dis-
covery and trial would reveal to be meritorious.  Denying a motion to
dismiss, however, creates the risk of false positive error since the pros-
pect of burdensome discovery may cause a defendant to settle a case that
discovery and trial would reveal to be nonmeritorious.  In Twombly and
Iqbal, the Supreme Court chose to focus on the risk of false positives,
imposing a stringent pleading requirement on plaintiffs whose com-
plaints raised the prospect of burdensome discovery.
Both Twombly and Iqbal involved areas of substantive law in which
the cost of false positive errors is high, and both involved situations in
which the likelihood of false positive error was high.  The likelihood of
false positives was high because the cases focused on elements of claims
that raise the prospect of disproportionately burdensome discovery on the
defendant.  This was so because the facts relevant to those elements were
known directly by the defendants principally.  Because the expected cost
of false positive error was high, the Court imposed a stringent pleading
standard on both sets of plaintiffs.
The rationale behind Twombly and Iqbal’s pleading standards thus
applies where both the cost and the likelihood of false positives are high.
If the expected cost is not high, the stringent pleading standard applied in
Twombly and Iqbal is not justified.  Applying the Twombly/Iqbal reason-
ing, therefore, requires an assessment of the expected cost implicated by
each element of each substantive claim in controversy.  Part III demon-
strated the application of that reasoning in the context of various ele-
ments of claims under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and concluded
that the expected cost of false positive error was high only with respect
to some of those elements.  Thus, the stringent pleading standard applied
in Twombly and Iqbal would be justified in application only to those
elements of Sherman Act claims.  Determining the correct approach to
pleading in other substantive areas of law will require similar element-
by-element analysis.
